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ABSTRACT—Under the standard interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, the so-
called Holmes test, pleading a federal cause of action is sufficient for 
finding federal question jurisdiction. In January 2012, the Supreme Court, 
in Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, LLC, recharacterized this standard 
test for § 1331 jurisdiction as one that considers whether “federal law 
creates [both] a private right of action and furnishes the substantive rules of 
decision.” In this first piece to address the Mims Court’s significant change 
to the § 1331 canon, I applaud its rights-inclusive holding. I contend that 
this rights-inclusive view rests upon a firmer jurisprudential framework 
than does the Holmes test, as the latter is intertwined with an anachronistic 
pairing of causes of action and rights with Justice Holmes’s overall “bad 
man” approach to the law. I argue further that Mims’s rights-inclusive 
approach more accurately describes § 1331 doctrine as a whole, helping to 
illuminate that—contrary to the Holmes test—merely pleading a federal 
cause of action is neither necessary nor sufficient for taking statutory 
federal question jurisdiction. I also demonstrate that this rights-inclusive 
view is more solicitous of the intent of the 1875 Congress, which passed 
§ 1331, and of the intentions of later-in-time Congresses, which passed 
legislation against the presumption that federal rights provide grounds for 
taking federal question jurisdiction, than is the Holmes test. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Statutory federal question jurisdiction forms the bedrock of federal 
court authority1—the vesting of which raises several doctrinally2 and 
pragmatically3 significant issues. In Mims v. Arrow Financial Services, 
LLC,4 the United States Supreme Court again ventured into this substantial 
body of law, holding that private enforcement suits brought under the 
Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 19915 (TCPA) take subject matter 
jurisdiction as federal questions under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Section 1331 
grants federal district courts original subject matter jurisdiction over “all 
civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
 
1  Indeed, the federal courts hear the majority of their civil suits in federal question jurisdiction. 
From March 2010 to March 2011, 294,336 civil cases were filed in the federal courts. OFFICE OF 
JUDGES PROGRAMS, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS: 
MARCH 31, 2011, at 46 tbl.C-2 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/
FederalJudicialCaseloadStatistics/2011/tables/C02Mar11.pdf. Of these, 45,370 cases took subject matter 
jurisdiction by virtue of the United States being a party. Id. Of the 248,966 cases not involving the 
federal government, 140,889 were filed as federal question cases while only 108,072 took jurisdiction 
due to the diversity of the parties. Id. 
2  See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (holding that without subject 
matter jurisdiction a federal court is only empowered to dismiss the case before it). 
3  See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything 
About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 593–94 & n.42 
(1998) (finding through empirical study that the removal of a case from the state court system to the 
federal court system reduced plaintiffs’ statistical likelihood of winning from 53% to 33%). 
4  132 S. Ct. 740 (2012). 
5  Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006)). 
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States.”6 Despite the prior circuit court split on the matter,7 the resolution of 
this TCPA-specific question is not overly surprising.8 The lasting impact of 
Mims, I contend, will be the Court’s recasting of the standard § 1331 
interpretation away from the Holmes test and toward a rights-inclusive view 
of statutory federal question jurisdiction. 
Since he delivered it in 1916, Justice Holmes’s formulation of the 
standard § 1331 test, which finds that “[a] suit arises under the law that 
creates the cause of action,”9 has come to dominate discussions of statutory 
federal question jurisdiction, even as the contours of the test have evolved. 
When Justice Holmes delivered the classic formulation of his test, he 
intended the presence of a federal cause of action to be both the necessary 
and sufficient condition for the taking of § 1331 jurisdiction. Nevertheless, 
in cases like Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & 
Manufacturing,10 where the Justices found § 1331 jurisdiction over a suit 
that paired a state law cause of action with a federal right,11 the Court 
effectively rejected this classic presentation of the Holmes test. Despite this 
rejection of the necessary-condition reading of the Holmes test, the Court 
continues to treat such deviations from the classic statement of the test as 
special and small exceptions to an otherwise generally applicable rule. 
Moreover, the Court continues to assert, under a modern incarnation of the 
Holmes test, that the presence of a federal cause of action is a near 
universally sufficient, even if not always necessary, condition for the taking 
of § 1331 jurisdiction.12 
Mims, in a break with this cause-of-action-centric tradition, recasts the 
standard § 1331 test as one that looks to whether “federal law creates [both] 
a private right of action and furnishes the substantive rules of decision.”13 In 
this first piece to address Mims’s holding, I laud the Court’s move as more 
 
6  28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006). 
7  See Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 747 (noting the circuit split). 
8  See Ronald Mann, Opinion Recap: Court Requires Federal Hearing in Telemarketing Case, 
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 19, 2012, 12:41 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/01/opinion-recap-court-
requires-federal-hearing-in-telemarketing-case (“[T]he Court stuck with the well-settled rules for 
federal-question jurisdiction, rejecting the conclusion of most of the courts of appeals that the odd 
language of the federal [TCPA] relegated suits under that statute to state courts.”). 
9  Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.). 
10  545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
11  I have previously argued that the Holmes test poorly describes a host of circumstances in which 
the state law causes of action are merged with federal rights and vice versa. See Lumen N. Mulligan, 
Jurisdiction by Cross-Reference, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1177, 1180 (2011) [hereinafter Mulligan, Cross-
Reference] (arguing that the federal courts take federal question jurisdiction not based upon the Holmes 
test but upon finding that they maintain declaratory power over the substantive law). 
12  In the remainder of this Article, I will use “Holmes test” to mean this modern sufficiency-only 
incantation. I will deploy “classic Holmes test” to mean Justice Holmes’s stronger original view that a 
federal cause of action was both a sufficient and necessary condition for § 1331 jurisdiction. 
13  Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 748–49 (2012); see also infra notes 83–87 and 
accompanying text (listing other rights-inclusive quotations from Mims). 
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jurisprudentially sound than the Holmes test, more descriptively accurate of 
§ 1331 doctrine, and more solicitous of congressional intent. 
I proceed as follows. In Part I, I consider the jurisprudential 
underpinnings of the Holmes test and the rights-inclusive view forwarded 
by Mims. I begin by defining the relevant analytic units of this jurisdictional 
discussion: cause of action (i.e., the determination that a person falls into a 
class of litigants empowered to vindicate a specified right in court) and 
rules of decision (i.e., clearly stated, mandatory, judicially enforceable 
obligations, which I will style as “rights”). I then turn to a presentation of 
the Holmes test and its jurisprudential foundations. Despite the fact that 
early federal question jurisdictional practice took a rights-inclusive view, 
Justice Holmes specifically eschewed rights, unadorned with causes of 
action, as a meaningful, stand-alone legal category. His position on this 
score flows from his famous “bad man” theory of law—the view that law is 
best understood not from a moral vantage point, but from that of the bad 
man who cares only to know the predictable judicial responses to his 
conduct. That is to say, Justice Holmes, generally speaking, focused solely 
upon the enforcement aspect of law, which in the civil context corresponds 
to causes of action and not rights per se. The Court, however, has since 
accepted that rights are meaningfully severable concepts from causes of 
action, leaving the Holmes test out of step with current jurisprudential 
norms. I end Part I with a discussion of the Mims opinion. Here I highlight 
the two § 1331 innovations crafted by the decision: namely, a presumption 
in favor of § 1331 jurisdiction and a rights-inclusive formulation of the 
standard § 1331 test. 
In Part II, I turn to a descriptive claim that the Mims opinion’s 
inclusion of both federal causes of action and rights as components of the 
default § 1331 jurisdictional analysis is more accurate of the statutory 
federal question canon than the Holmes test. Here I argue that the rhetoric 
of the Holmes test creates more confusion than clarity, and that while this 
muddled approach to § 1331 is often good enough for government work,14 
both jurists15 and commentators16 desire greater coherence. I contend that 
 
14  See 13D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3562, at 177 
(3d ed. 2008) (“This lack of clarity in an important jurisdictional statute would be intolerable were it not 
for the fact that the cases raising a serious question whether jurisdiction exists are comparatively rare.”). 
15  See, e.g., Grable, 545 U.S. at 320–22 (Thomas, J., concurring) (lamenting the lack of clear-cut 
rules for § 1331 jurisdiction); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 818 (1988) 
(arguing that uncertain jurisdictional rules have the regrettable effect of allowing “[p]arties [to] spend 
years litigating claims only to learn that their efforts and expense were wasted in a court that lacked 
jurisdiction”); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 822 n.1 (1986) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (stating a view, held by many, that § 1331 doctrine as it now stands is “infinitely 
malleable”). 
16  See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between 
Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1225 (2004) (“One ought not make a fetish of 
bright line rules, but they have their place, and one place in particular is the law of jurisdiction.”); John 
F. Preis, Jurisdiction and Discretion in Hybrid Law Cases, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 145, 190–92 (2006) 
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when the language of the Holmes test is pushed aside, it is clear that the 
Court consistently holds that the existence of a federal cause of action is 
neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the vesting of § 1331 
jurisdiction. I do so in three steps: First, I look to four categories of suits in 
which the courts refuse § 1331 jurisdiction even though the plaintiff 
presents a federal cause of action—contrary to the dictates of the modern 
incarnation of the Holmes test. I next contrast these four sets of cases with 
suits where the Court will take federal question jurisdiction over claims 
featuring federal causes of action over state law rights, noting that only a 
rights-inclusive jurisdictional theory can meaningfully distinguish between 
them. Finally, I end with a discussion of the opinions that take § 1331 
jurisdiction over state law causes of action with embedded federal rights, in 
conflict with the terms of the classic iteration of the Holmes test. On clarity 
grounds alone, then, the Mims opinion’s recasting of the standard § 1331 
test in rights-inclusive terms is a step in the right direction. 
In Part III, I consider the role for congressional intent in § 1331 cases. 
As one prominent commentator has described the consensus view, 
“Congress’s intent [in enacting § 1331] has had little or nothing to do with 
the Court’s decisions concerning what constitutes a federal question.”17 The 
Mims reformulation of the standard § 1331 test, I contend, blunts this line of 
commentary by increasing the role for congressional intent in two ways. 
First, basing § 1331 jurisdiction, as the Mims Court did, in part upon the 
federal nature of the right comports more with the intention of the 1875 
Congress that passed the statute18 than does the Holmes test.19 Second, the 
 
(calling for the adoption of a rule, as opposed to a standard, in Smith-style cases); Martin H. Redish, 
Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction 
and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769, 1794 (1992) (arguing that “jurisdictional 
uncertainty can surely lead to both a waste of judicial time and added expense to the litigants”). 
17  Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 
85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 24 (1990). 
18  The general federal question jurisdictional statute has not always been codified at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331. Nevertheless, I do not employ the cumbersome “predecessor statute to § 1331” locution when 
referring to cases dealing with the Act as codified in a different location. Instead, I simply refer to this 
Act as § 1331, even if at a previous time it was codified at a different location. This approach is sound 
because, excepting statutory amounts in controversy, the Act has been essentially unchanged since 1875. 
See, e.g., Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 
(striking out the minimum amount in controversy requirement of $10,000); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. 
No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415 (raising the minimum amount in controversy requirement from $3,000 to 
$10,000); Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (stating that federal trial courts “shall have 
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at 
common law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds . . . five hundred dollars, and arising 
under the Constitution or law of the United States, or treaties made”). Finally, following most scholars, I 
exclude the short-lived general grant of federal question jurisdiction passed at the end of President John 
Adams’s term and treat the 1875 Act as the first general federal question grant. See, e.g., Mims, 132 S. 
Ct. at 747 n.6 (discounting the federal question jurisdictional act passed in the Adams Administration). 
19  See Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes, 
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151, 2171–73 (2009); see also infra Part III.A. 
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Mims Court’s focus upon both the federal cause of action and the federal 
right asserted brings greater insight into the intentions of later-in-time 
Congresses, which passed legislation against the presumption that federal 
rights provide grounds for taking federal question jurisdiction, than does the 
Holmes test. As such, I conclude that the Court should continue on the path 
it blazes in Mims and eschew the Holmes test in favor of a standard § 1331 
theory that looks to both causes of action and rights. 
I. CAUSES OF ACTION AND RIGHTS IN § 1331 JURISPRUDENCE 
I turn my attention first to the elements of § 1331 analysis and the 
jurisprudential notions supporting their use. First, I lay out the technical 
meanings of the terms “cause of action” and “right”—or, as the Mims Court 
refers to it, “the rule of decision.” Next, I explore the role that these notions 
play in the formulation of the Holmes test and its philosophical 
underpinnings. I end this Part by contrasting the Holmes test’s federal-
cause-of-action-centered approach to § 1331 jurisdiction with the Mims 
Court’s rights-inclusive approach. 
A. Cause of Action and Right Defined 
To understand the distinction between the classic formulation of the 
Holmes test and the approach taken in Mims, one must take in the technical 
distinctions between the concepts of right, which the Mims opinion styles as 
rule of decision,20 and cause of action, which the Court uses as the basic 
analytic units of its § 1331 analysis. Under the now-prevailing view, a right 
is an obligation owed by the defendant to the plaintiff as an intended 
beneficiary.21 Further, to qualify as a right, an obligation must be 
 
20  For the last twenty years, the Court has regularly treated “rule of decision” as synonymous with 
“right.” See, e.g., Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A., v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442 
(2010) (equating the Rules Enabling Act’s use of “right” with “rule of decision”); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 284–85 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting) (same in regard to the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 373 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same 
in regard to treaties); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2006) 
(same in regard to a discussion of federal common law); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 177 
(2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same in regard to FELA); Atherton v. 
FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 226 (1997) (same in regard to federal common law); Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 
U.S. 61, 75 (1996) (same in regard to Erie); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874, 937 (1994) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (same in regard to the Voting Rights Act); Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 
98 (1991) (same in regard to federal common law). In line with this practice, I treat the terms as 
synonyms as well. 
21  See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 238–39 (1979) (distinguishing rights from causes of action 
and noting that status as an intended beneficiary of a statute may create rights without creating a cause 
of action); id. at 241 (construing rights as obligations designed to benefit individuals, even if the right 
holder lacks a cause of action to enforce them). 
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mandatory, not merely hortatory,22 and the language at issue must not be 
“too vague and amorphous” or “beyond the competence of the judiciary to 
enforce.”23 This three-part test—mandatory obligation, clear statement, and 
enforceability24—remains the standard by which the Court determines when 
a right exists.25 
This notion of obligation can be thought of in Hohfeldian vernacular in 
that the obligation imposes a correlative duty upon the defendant to either 
refrain from interfering with, or to assist, the plaintiff.26 Similarly, 
deploying the terminology of the legal process school, which itself followed 
Hohfeld closely here,27 the concept of a right is one that imposes a 
correlative, authoritative duty that the defendant owes to the plaintiff to do 
an action or to refrain from an action.28 
A cause of action is the distinct determination of whether the plaintiff 
falls into a class of litigants empowered to enforce a specified right in 
court.29 Or as the Court alternatively put the notion, a “cause of action is a 
question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of 
 
22  See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 24 (1981) (finding that 
provisions of the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act “were intended to be 
hortatory, not mandatory”). 
23  Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 431–32 (1987). 
24  This last prong is, or nearly is, identical to the concept of remedy. But whether a court can issue 
an effective remedy is best understood as a matter of standing. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 
U.S. 555, 561–62 (1992) (discussing redressability). Including redressability in the rights analysis is 
double counting at best. A more troubling result could be the collapse of the distinction between rights 
and remedy, as this final statement appears to incorporate redressability as part of the rights analysis. 
Given that the Court has consistently striven since the 1970s to distinguish between rights and remedies, 
see Donald H. Zeigler, Rights, Rights of Action, and Remedies: An Integrated Approach, 76 WASH. L. 
REV. 67, 83–104 (2001) (criticizing this jurisprudential move), however, it would be a disservice to read 
this collapse of rights and remedies into this Article’s jurisdictional analysis unless it is absolutely 
necessary. I will thus focus on the notions of mandatory obligation and clear statement. 
25  See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); see also 
Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340–41 (1997) (discussing the three-part test); Livadas v. 
Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132–33 (1994) (applying the three-part test to a § 1983 claim); Suter v. Artist 
M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (applying the three-part test to find that the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act of 1980 “does not unambiguously confer an enforceable right upon the Act’s 
beneficiaries”); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509–10 (1990) (applying the three-part test to 
the Boren Amendment). 
26  See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917) (critiquing legal analysis for imprecise use of terminology and 
introducing the idea that rights are best understood as obligations coupled with correlative duties); 
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913) (critiquing the same). 
27  HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 127–28 & n.4 (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (importing Hohfeld’s theory of jural opposites). 
28  Id. at 130 (concluding that a primary duty is “an authoritatively recognized obligation . . . not to 
do something, or to do it, or to do it if at all only in a prescribed way”); see also Woolhandler & Collins, 
supra note 19, at 2154–55 (discussing Hart and Sacks’s views on primary and remedial rights). 
29  See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 & n.18 (1979). 
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litigants that may, as a matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the 
court.”30 Cause of action corresponds to the legal process school’s concept 
of remedial rights. That is, a right of action, as Hart and Sacks style it, is the 
power to invoke the defendant’s duty to provide a remedy for the violation 
of a primary right.31 
The concept of cause of action, then, is necessarily related to the 
concept of a right insofar as plaintiffs must have rights before they can be 
persons empowered to enforce them. But the concept of a cause of action is 
not the equivalent of a right itself. As Hart and Sacks noted,32 one may have 
a right yet lack the power to enforce the right by way of a cause of action. 
For example, an individual’s rights under certain statutory schemes may 
only be vindicated by an administrative agency—not by the individuals 
themselves.33 As such, Congress may vest individuals with rights but not 
vest them with causes of action to enforce those rights by way of private 
suit. 
B. The Philosophy of the Holmes Test 
While contemporary doctrine views causes of action and rights as 
distinct concepts, the common law tended to treat these as necessarily 
linked. Justice Holmes’s formulation of his jurisdictional test was delivered 
at a time when jurists were just beginning to challenge the inevitability of 
this congruity. Holmes’s focus on cause of action—the ability to enforce a 
right—is in large part a reaction, based upon his “bad man” approach to the 
law, to the separating of the analytic concept of cause of action from right. 
At common law, the concepts of right (or what is often referred to as 
the “primary right” or the “rule of decision”) and cause of action (or what is 
sometimes referred to as “remedial right” or a “right of action”) were 
thought to be immutably linked—one did not exist without the other.34 
Examples abound. Marbury v. Madison, for instance, held that “it is a 
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a 
 
30  Id. at 240 n.18. 
31  See HART & SACKS, supra note 27, at 137. 
32  Id. at 138. 
33  See, e.g., Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453, 457 (1974) 
(holding that power to vindicate rights rests with the Attorney General); see also Davis, 442 U.S. at 241 
(“For example, statutory rights and obligations are often embedded in complex regulatory schemes, so 
that if they are not enforced through private causes of action, they may nevertheless be enforced through 
alternative mechanisms, such as criminal prosecutions, or other public causes of actions.” (citation 
omitted)). 
34  See, e.g., Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REV. 777, 783 
(2004) (“At the time of the American Founding, the question whether a plaintiff had a cause of action 
was generally inseparable from the question whether the forms of proceeding at law and in equity 
afforded the plaintiff a remedy for an asserted grievance.”); Zeigler, supra note 24, at 71–83 (describing 
the traditional approach to rights, causes of action, and remedies). 
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legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.”35 
Similarly, the Court in McFaul v. Ramsey,36 lamenting that many states had 
“ruthlessly abolished” writ pleading, reasoned that “[t]he distinction 
between the different forms of actions for different wrongs, requiring 
different remedies, lies in the nature of things; it is absolutely inseparable 
from the correct administration of justice in common-law courts.”37 Under 
this earlier jurisprudence, “courts did not view a cause of action as a 
separate procedural entity, independent of a right and remedy, that had to be 
present for an action to go forward.”38 Even nineteenth-century reformers, 
such as John Austin, who saw a distinction between “primary rights” and 
causes of action (which he styled as “secondary rights”) as useful for 
taxonomical purposes,39 accepted that for pragmatic purposes the two 
notions must work in tandem.40 Commenting upon this history, Justice 
Harlan noted that “contemporary modes of jurisprudential thought . . . 
appeared to link ‘rights’ and ‘remedies’ in a 1:1 correlation.”41 
Justice Holmes’s classic presentation of his test for § 1331 jurisdiction, 
delivered in 1916 in his American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co. 
opinion, was delivered against this traditional common law backdrop.42 In 
American Well Works, the plaintiff held the patent for, manufactured, and 
sold what was then considered the best pump on the market. The plaintiff 
contended that the defendant stated that plaintiff’s pump infringed the 
defendant’s patent. Instead of bringing an infringement case, however, the 
plaintiff brought libel and slander (i.e., state law) causes of action in 
Arkansas state court. The defendant removed to federal court.43 This 
removal raised the federal question jurisdictional issue for the Supreme 
Court. While recognizing that the suit implicated matters of federal patent 
rights, Justice Holmes focused on the state law origin of the causes of 
action and held for the Court that a “suit arises under the law that creates 
the cause of action.”44 
As Woolhandler and Collins convincingly argue, Justice Holmes, 
noting the beginnings of the jurisprudential movement to embrace rights 
 
35  5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803) (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23). 
36  61 U.S. (20 How.) 523, 525 (1857). 
37  Id. 
38  Zeigler, supra note 24, at 72. 
39  See 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 770–71 (Robert Campbell ed., London, John 
Murray 5th ed. 1885); see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 19, at 2155–56 (discussing Austin’s 
views on primary and secondary rights). 
40  See 2 AUSTIN, supra note 39, at 768 (“For a primary right or duty is not of itself a right or duty, 
without the secondary right or duty by which it is sustained; and e converso.”). 
41  Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 401 n.3 
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Zeigler, supra note 24, at 72. 
42  241 U.S. 257 (1916). 
43  Id. at 258–59. 
44  Id. at 260. 
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and causes of action as distinct concepts, purposefully chose to focus upon 
causes of action as the key jurisdictional predicate under § 1331.45 Justice 
Holmes favored the traditional pairing of rights and causes of action 
(which, following Austin, he styled as primary and secondary rights) as 
inseparable notions.46 This position flowed from his general jurisprudential 
perspective that the law should be conceived from the point of view of the 
“bad man” who cares not for duties and rights simpliciter, but only for 
predictable consequences to his actions that will lead to imprisonment or 
compulsory monetary payments.47 
Justice Holmes made this point often. For example, in a letter to Sir 
Frederick Pollock, Holmes stated: 
I become less and less inclined to make much use of the distinction between 
primary rights duties [sic] and consequences or sanctioning rights or whatever 
you may call them. The primary duty is little more than a convenient index to, 
or mode of predicting the point of incidence of the public force.48 
He again expounded upon this philosophy in The Path of the Law, arguing 
that: 
 Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than 
in the law of contract. Among other things, here again the so called primary 
rights and duties are invested with a mystic significance beyond what can be 
assigned and explained. The duty to keep a contract at common law means a 
prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing 
else.49 
Given this overarching focus on enforceability in Justice Holmes’s 
approach to the law, it is little wonder that he chose to focus on the cause of 
action (i.e., the determination that the plaintiff is entitled to enforce a right) 
over unadorned rights (i.e., mandatory, enforceable, clear obligations) in 
concluding whether a suit arose under federal law. 
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.50 
further proves this point. In Smith, a stockholder plaintiff brought a breach 
of fiduciary duty cause of action under state law, alleging that bonds issued 
by a federal agency and purchased by the company were unconstitutionally 
 
45  See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 19, at 2178–83. I am entirely indebted to Woolhandler 
and Collins for this point. 
46  Id. at 2179 (“Holmes eschewed the concept of primary rights as distinct from remedial rights.”). 
47  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897) [hereinafter 
Holmes, The Path of the Law]; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REV. 40, 42 
(1918) (“But for legal purposes a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy—the imagination of a 
substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought to bear upon those who do things to 
contravene it . . . .”). 
48  Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Frederick Pollock (Mar. 25, 1883), in 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK 
LETTERS 20–21 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1941). 
49  Holmes, The Path of the Law, supra note 47, at 462. 
50  255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
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created.51 Thus, this case would not satisfy the Holmes test as presented in 
American Well Works because the plaintiff had not brought a federal cause 
of action. Nevertheless, the Court held that federal question jurisdiction 
arose under § 1331 because the plaintiff’s state law claim required 
adjudication of constitutional rights.52 In his dissent, Justice Holmes 
stressed the importance of enforceability—which is expressed doctrinally 
by the cause of action, not rights unadorned—to the jurisdictional question. 
He reasoned that: 
The mere adoption by a state law of a United States law as a criterion or test, 
when the law of the United States has no force proprio vigore, does not cause 
a case under the state law to be also a case under the law of the United States, 
and so it has been decided by this Court again and again.53 
Reiterating this point, he argued that the constitutional right at issue here 
“depends for its relevance and effect not on its own force but upon the law 
that took it up, so I repeat once more the cause of action arises wholly from 
the law of the State.”54 
The classic Holmes test, the view that § 1331 jurisdiction only arises if 
federal law creates the cause of action, was conceived in large part as an 
attempt to retain the traditional one-to-one relationship between causes of 
action and rights that was beginning to disintegrate in the early twentieth 
century. Under the Holmesian view, any other focus would incoherently 
conflate mere moral duties (i.e., rights per se) with law (i.e., predictable 
applications of force). It is a view, then, most jurisprudentially at home in 
the traditional common law context of a one-to-one correspondence 
between rights and causes of action. 
Justice Holmes’s rearguard action against the disentangling of causes 
of action from rights did not succeed, however. The traditional view was 
entirely wiped away in the 1970s when the Court fully adopted the new 
regime.55 Starting with National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National 
Ass’n of Railroad Passengers,56 Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. 
 
51  Id. at 195–98. 
52  Id. at 199; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312–
13 (2005) (discussing the Smith test); Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808–09 
(1986) (discussing federal question jurisdiction where the state law right turned on “some construction 
of federal law”); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (citing 
Flournoy v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 270–72 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); T. B. Harms Co. v. 
Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.)) (finding the Holmes test as a rule of inclusion). 
53  Smith, 255 U.S. at 215 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
54  Id. at 214. 
55  See Zeigler, supra note 24, at 83–104. Zeigler notes this as a sea change. But see Laura S. 
Fitzgerald, Is Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1207, 1241–45 (2001) (noting how the 
two-track approach has developed over many decades). 
56  414 U.S. 453, 457 (1974) (acknowledging the existence of rights and duties under the Amtrak 
Act but questioning whether the respondent had a cause of action to enforce them). 
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Barbour,57 and Cort v. Ash,58 the Court explicitly differentiated rights from 
the ability to enforce them by way of a cause of action.59 By the end of the 
decade, the Court in Davis v. Passman60 squarely held that the notions of 
right and cause of action constituted distinct analytic concepts. The Court 
continues to adhere to this basic framework established in Passman.61 Thus, 
Justice Holmes’s jurisdictional theory, which is predicated upon the linking 
of rights to causes of action, is no longer in step with the Court’s 
jurisprudential commitments. 
Despite the collapse of the jurisprudential underpinnings of the Holmes 
test, the Holmes test’s cause-of-action-centered approach to § 1331 
jurisdiction continues to define the default federal question jurisdictional 
test.62 Indeed, prior to Mims, the dominant § 1331 rhetoric presented the 
Holmes test as providing the basis for taking jurisdiction in the vast 
majority of federal question cases.63 Of course, as the discussion of Smith 
illustrates, the federal courts have not universally embraced the Holmes 
 
57  421 U.S. 412, 420–23 (1975) (acknowledging that the Securities Investor Protection Act grants 
plaintiffs beneficial rights but questioning whether they have a cause of action to force the agency to 
enforce them). 
58  422 U.S. 66, 74–85 (1975) (noting that the corporate action in question was in violation of a 
federal criminal statute but questioning whether plaintiffs had a cause of action to privately enforce the 
prohibition). 
59  Zeigler, supra note 24, at 85–86. 
60  442 U.S. 228, 238–39 (1979). 
61  See supra Part I.A (discussing the contemporary view of rights and causes of action). 
62  The classic presentation of the Holmes test was made in 1916. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne 
& Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916) (Holmes, J.) (“A suit arises under the law that creates the cause 
of action.”). A Westlaw search for citations to the “headnote” corresponding to this quote returned 510 
judicial citations on January 29, 2012. Such a count, of course, does not track invocations of the Holmes 
test that do not cite American Well Works Co. A Westlaw search in the “allfeds” database of the string 
(“cause of action” /s arise /s “federal law”) brought a return of 2765 hits on January 29, 2012. This 
search likely overcounts, given that this string may well return discussions of bodies of law beyond 
§ 1331 jurisdiction. In any event, the Court itself invokes the Holmes test as the standard § 1331 rule 
regularly. See, e.g., Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165 (2008) 
(“The determination of who can seek a remedy has significant consequences for the reach of federal 
power.”); Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 706 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005); Jones 
v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377 (2004); Nebraska v. Wyoming, 515 U.S. 1, 25 (1995) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 
U.S. 800, 808 (1988); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63 (1987); Franchise Tax Bd. v. 
Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983); Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 
U.S. 394, 409 (1981); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 100 (1972); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, 
AFL-CIO v. Cent. Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 696 (1963); Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 
358 U.S. 354, 393 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); Moore v. Chesapeake 
& Ohio Ry. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 217 (1934); Missouri ex rel. St. Louis, B. & M. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 266 
U.S. 200, 207–08 (1924); Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922); see 
also 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 3562, at 183 (noting that the Holmes test is the “starting 
point,” even if not the whole story, for § 1331 analysis). 
63  Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986). 
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test64—that is, the Court does recognize, on occasion, that § 1331 
jurisdiction vests based solely upon the pleading of a substantial federal 
right without pleading a federal cause of action.65 Yet, but six years prior to 
Mims, the Court held that Smith’s rights-centric jurisdictional view 
belonged to a “special and small category” of § 1331 authority,66 a point 
that the courts of appeals uniformly mimic.67 Moreover, even when the 
Court acknowledges that pleading a federal cause of action is not a 
necessary condition for § 1331 jurisdiction,68 it stresses that the presence of 
a federal cause of action, subject to one rare exception,69 is “a sufficient 
condition for federal-question jurisdiction.”70 Thus, under the contemporary 
 
64  See, e.g., Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 699 (confirming the general availability of § 1331 
jurisdiction under a Grable & Sons theory, even though a Grable & Sons theory did not adhere under the 
facts of the case); Grable, 545 U.S. at 315 (holding that § 1331 jurisdiction arose over a federal statutory 
right created by the Internal Revenue Code that was embedded in a state law quiet title claim); Textile 
Workers Union of Am. v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the Holmes test is not always necessary for § 1331 jurisdiction); Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 597 (1949) (Jackson, J., plurality) (questioning the need to 
strictly adhere to the Holmes test). 
65  See, e.g., T. B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.) (Holmes test 
is a rule of inclusion); see also Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 809 n.5 (quoting T. B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 
827); Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 9 (quoting T. B. Harms, 339 F.2d at 827, and holding that § 1331 
jurisdiction can arise over state law causes of action); Fitzgerald, supra note 55, at 1241–45 (describing 
the Court’s “two-track” approach to § 1331 jurisdiction); Richard D. Freer, Of Rules and Standards: 
Reconciling Statutory Limitations on “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 82 IND. L.J. 309, 324–28 (2007) 
(arguing that the Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. line of cases employs a different test than the 
Holmes line of cases); John B. Oakley, Federal Jurisdiction and the Problem of the Litigative Unit: 
When Does What “Arise Under” Federal Law?, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1829, 1837–43 (1998) (describing the 
distinction between Category I and Category II jurisdiction). 
66  Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 699, 701 (describing Grable-style jurisdiction as a slim 
category). 
67  Every circuit to address the matter since Empire Healthchoice has described jurisdiction under 
Grable & Sons as a limited exception to the primary Holmes test approach to § 1331 jurisdiction. See, 
e.g., Bender v. Jordan, 623 F.3d 1128, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the present case fits into the 
narrow circumstances in which Grable & Sons jurisdiction may apply); Kalick v. Nw. Airlines Corp., 
372 F. App’x 317, 320 (3d Cir. 2010) (describing Grable & Sons jurisdiction as a slim category); 
Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding Grable & Sons 
jurisdiction to be a special, small category); Morgan Cnty. War Mem’l Hosp. ex rel. Bd. of Dirs. of War 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Baker, 314 F. App’x 529, 535 (4th Cir. 2008) (describing Grable & Sons jurisdiction as 
a slim category); Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 
1262, 1271–72 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that the Court’s opinions in Grable & Sons and Empire 
Healthchoice effectuate a retreat from a broad reading of Smith); Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 
501 F.3d 555, 574 (6th Cir. 2007) (allowing Grable & Sons jurisdiction only if it will have a 
“microscopic effect” on the balance of state versus federal jurisdiction); Bennett v. Sw. Airlines Co., 
484 F.3d 907, 910 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting defendant’s argument that a broadly applicable reading of 
Grable & Sons was “squelched” by Empire Healthchoice). 
68  See supra note 65. 
69  See Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 317 n.5 (citing Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 
507 (1900)); see also Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 748 n.8 (2012) (similarly citing 
to Shoshone). 
70  Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 317; accord Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 748. 
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prevailing view, meeting the Holmes test is a sufficient condition for 
obtaining § 1331 jurisdiction, with deviations to this cause-of-action-
centered approach constituting “rare exceptions” or “special and small 
categories” diverging from this generally applicable norm. 
C. Mims’s Rights-Inclusive Theory 
Mims’s incorporation of rights into the standard jurisdictional analysis, 
then, presents a substantial shift in § 1331 doctrine. Accordingly, I turn to a 
brief discussion of the Mims decision. I review the Court’s two substantial 
§ 1331 innovations: the creation of a presumption of federal question 
jurisdiction and the move toward a rights-inclusive standard view of § 1331 
jurisdiction, arguing that the rights-inclusive view constitutes the holding of 
the Court. 
Mims is a TCPA case. The TCPA renders certain aggressive interstate 
telephonic communications illegal as overly intrusive of privacy or 
otherwise a nuisance.71 The plaintiff in Mims alleged that the defendant, a 
debt collection company, repeatedly used automatic dialing systems and 
artificial voice systems to call his phone in violation of the TCPA.72 He filed 
for declaratory relief, an injunction, and damages in federal court.73 The 
district court, following Eleventh Circuit precedent, dismissed for lack of 
federal question subject matter jurisdiction,74 a decision affirmed by the 
court of appeals.75 Reversing, the Supreme Court held that claims brought 
under the TCPA do arise under § 1331.76 
The Eleventh Circuit, and those courts following its approach, had 
reasoned that the TCPA itself prohibited § 1331 jurisdiction. The TCPA, as 
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) in a provision entitled “Private Right of 
Action,” states: 
A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the law or rules of court of a 
State, bring in an appropriate court of that State . . . an action based on a 
violation of this subsection . . . . 
Looking to this language with its focus on state courts, as well as legislative 
history and the structure of the act, several courts of appeals held that 
Congress had excluded § 1331 jurisdiction over private TCPA suits.77 The 
 
71  See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A)–(D) (2006) (outlawing four types of interstate telephonic 
communications). 
72  Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 746. 
73  Id. at 746–47. 
74  Id. at 747. 
75  Id. 
76  Id. at 745 (“We hold, therefore, that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 
private suits arising under the TCPA.”). 
77  See, e.g., Nicholson v. Hooters of Augusta, Inc., 136 F.3d 1287, 1288–89 (11th Cir. 1998), 
abrogated by Mims, 132 S. Ct. 740; see also Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 747 (noting the circuit split). 
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Supreme Court disagreed, holding that “[n]othing in the text, structure, 
purpose, or legislative history of the TCPA calls for displacement of the 
federal-question jurisdiction U.S. district courts ordinarily have under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.”78 While much of the Court’s opinion examines 
congressional intent as expressed in the TCPA to vest federal question 
jurisdiction over private claims,79 I will focus on the Court’s § 1331-
centered discussion. 
The Mims Court made two significant moves with regard to § 1331 
doctrine. First, the Court held that there is a strong presumption that a 
congressionally created federal cause of action coupled with a federal right 
will take jurisdiction under § 1331. The Court stated this presumption as: 
[W]hen federal law creates a private right of action and furnishes the 
substantive rules of decision, the claim arises under federal law, and district 
courts possess federal-question jurisdiction under § 1331 . . . unless Congress 
divests federal courts of their § 1331 adjudicatory authority.80 
The Court itself defended this presumption by arguing that it is the mirror 
image of the previously accepted rule recognizing a presumption that suits 
arising in federal question jurisdiction can concurrently be heard in state 
courts.81 As I discuss in more detail later, this presumption in favor of 
§ 1331 jurisdiction is also well-founded upon congressional intent 
grounds.82 
Second, the Mims Court, contrary to the rhetoric of the Holmes test, 
presented a rights- and cause-of-action-inclusive standard formulation of 
the § 1331 analysis. The Court looked to both of these components in its 
presentation of the default § 1331 analysis no fewer than five times in the 
opinion, reasoning that: 
 Section 1331 jurisdiction arises here because “federal law [both] 
creates a private right of action and furnishes the substantive rules 
of decision.”83 
 Section 1331 jurisdiction arises here because “the TCPA is a 
federal law that both creates the claim Mims has brought and 
supplies the substantive rules that will govern the case.”84 
 “Because federal law creates the right of action and provides the 
rules of decision, Mims’s TCPA claim” arises under § 1331.85 
 
78  Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 753. 
79  Id. at 749–53 (discussing congressional intent regarding the TCPA). 
80  Id. at 748–49. 
81  Id. at 748 (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil 
Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)) (noting the presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction). 
82  See infra Part III.B. 
83  Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 748–49. 
84  Id. at 745. 
85  Id. at 748. 
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 Section 1331 jurisdiction arises “[h]ere, by contrast, [because] the 
TCPA not only creates the claim for relief and designates the 
remedy; critically, the Act and regulations thereunder supply the 
governing substantive law.”86 
 “Because federal law gives rise to the claim for relief . . . and 
specifies the substantive rules of decision” the federal courts have 
§ 1331 jurisdiction.87 
The Court here uses “claim” and “claim for relief” as synonymous with 
“cause of action.” While this use of synonyms is far from ideal,88 it is clear 
from the context that the Court intends “cause of action,” as defined in this 
Article, in the quotations above. For example, in the second quotation 
above, immediately before this selected text, the Court quotes American 
Well Works’ use of the term “cause of action,” the meaning of which it 
intends to import into the term “claim” in the quoted sentence above. Thus, 
the Court stated: 
We have long recognized that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the 
cause of action.” Beyond doubt, the TCPA is a federal law that both creates the 
claim Mims has brought and supplies the substantive rules that will govern the 
case.89 
Similarly, the fourth quotation’s use of “claim for relief,” when read in 
context, means “cause of action.”90 Here, the Court is discussing Shoshone 
Mining Co. v. Rutter,91 a case where Congress created a federal cause of 
action to remedy state law property rights, yet the Court held that § 1331 
jurisdiction did not arise.92 Thus, the Mims Court’s contrasting of the TCPA 
with the statute at issue in Shoshone Mining Co. intends to invoke the 
concept of “cause of action.” Additionally, the Court’s use of the terms 
“claim” and “claim for relief” in sentences with nearly identical content as 
when it uses the term “cause of action” further highlights the Court’s 
 
86  Id. at 748 n.8. 
87  Id. at 753. 
88  Slipshod use of differing terms plagues the Court’s statutory federal question jurisprudence. See, 
e.g., LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FEDERAL COURTS 91 (1994) (lamenting Supreme Court 
doctrine that “needlessly confuse[s] matters with outdated jargon and misleading generalizations,” and 
advocating “jurisdictional rules that can easily be applied at the outset of litigation”); Oakley, supra note 
65, at 1853 (noting various uses of the terms “claim” and “theory”). Often the Court inaptly imports 
terms originating from discussions of appellate jurisdiction into the § 1331 analysis. See William Cohen, 
The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. 
REV. 890, 904 (1967) (noting that phrases had been “uncritically transferred” from earlier cases 
involving appellate jurisdiction); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 
53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 160–63 (1953). 
89  Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 744–45 (citation omitted). 
90  Id. at 748 n.8. 
91  177 U.S. 505 (1900); see infra Part II.A.1 (discussing this case). 
92  See infra notes 123–27 and accompanying text (discussing Shoshone Mining Co.). 
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intention to use the terms synonymously. Given that the Court intended 
“cause of action” as defined in this Article, I will consistently use cause of 
action to describe the Court’s Mims analysis.93 Similarly, the Court’s use of 
“rule of decision” may be fairly read as synonymous with “right.”94 
The Mims Court’s rights-inclusive approach to the standard 
formulation of § 1331 jurisdiction is a significant shift. Justice Holmes 
crafted his cause-of-action-centered approach to § 1331 jurisdiction 
intentionally to exclude unadorned rights as a meaningful factor in the 
jurisdictional analysis.95 Further, to say that the Holmes test has since come 
to frame the default presentation of § 1331 jurisprudence would be quite the 
understatement.96 The Mims decision’s focus upon both causes of action and 
rights, then, is a substantial doctrinal shift. 
Nevertheless, I do not mean to overstate Mims’s effect, as this is not 
the first break with the Holmes test for the Court. The Court has questioned 
the validity of the classic Holmes test from time to time.97 Also, it has 
affirmed, at least in certain cases, the taking of § 1331 jurisdiction over 
state law causes of action with embedded federal rights—contrary to the 
dictates of the classic Holmes test.98 Finally, the Mims Court itself twice 
invokes the Holmes test by quoting American Well Works Co.99 
One could well argue that Mims, given the opinion’s recitation of the 
classic Holmes test, is best read not as a significant reformulation of the test 
but as a standard application of it. I contend, however, that this more 
modest reading of Mims is not the best interpretation. Mims marks a 
departure from standard § 1331 formulations by treating this rights-
inclusive focus not as a quirky exception to the default (i.e., classic Holmes 
test) view, but as an essential element of the standard presentation of the 
§ 1331 test. The key to understanding this point is that in both instances 
where the Mims Court invokes the Holmes test, it couples the classic 
statement of the test with a statement that § 1331 jurisdiction arises in Mims 
because federal law creates both the cause of action and the substantive 
rights at issue. Thus, the Court first states: 
We have long recognized that “[a] suit arises under the law that creates the 
cause of action.” Beyond doubt, the TCPA is a federal law that both creates the 
claim Mims has brought and supplies the substantive rules that will govern the 
 
93  See Lumen N. Mulligan, A Unified Theory of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 Jurisdiction, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
1667, 1682–83 (2008) [hereinafter Mulligan, A Unified Theory] (adopting and defending a similar 
position in describing the Court’s § 1331 jurisprudence). 
94  See sources cited supra note 20. 
95  See supra Part I.B. 
96  See supra notes 62–70 and accompanying text (discussing the dominance of Holmes test 
rhetoric). 
97  See cases cited supra note 64. 
98  See sources cited supra note 65. 
99  Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 744, 748 (2012). 
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case.100 
It follows this reformed presentation of the Holmes test with similar 
reasoning a few pages later, arguing that: 
Because federal law creates the right of action and provides the rules of 
decision, Mims’s TCPA claim, in 28 U.S.C. § 1331’s words, plainly “aris[es] 
under” the “laws . . . of the United States.” As already noted, “[a] suit arises 
under the law that creates the cause of action.”101 
This coupling of the classic statement of the Holmes test with the Mims 
Court’s rights-inclusive approach differs greatly from most past hedging 
about the strength of the Holmes test. Instead of listing a rights-inclusive 
approach to § 1331 jurisdiction as a “special and small category”102 or “an 
extremely rare exception”103 to the Holmes test, as has been the Court’s 
phraseology to date, the Mims opinion’s coupling of the classic presentation 
of the Holmes test with its rights-inclusive approach appears as an attempt 
to rehabilitate the Holmes test. That is to say, despite the origins and history 
of the Holmes test as a cause-of-action-centered conception of § 1331 
jurisdiction, Mims appears to recast the Holmes test as solicitous of both 
causes of action and rights in the standard § 1331 analysis. This 
recharacterization of the Holmes test, then, is a momentous shift in § 1331 
doctrine. 
This doctrinal shift appears to be a purposeful course correction by the 
Court. Mims’s rights-inclusive formulation of the standard § 1331 test 
comes as a part of the Court’s crafting of a presumption favoring § 1331 
jurisdiction.104 This presumption was key to the Court’s holding that TCPA 
suits arise under § 1331.105 This presumption, however, arises when only 
federal law creates both the right and the cause of action.106 Indeed, the 
Court describes the presence of federal rights in the TCPA as “critically” 
important to its jurisdictional analysis.107 Hence, there is little reason to 
think that the Court’s rhetorical shift to a rights-inclusive view in Mims was 
mere verbiage. Moreover, even if this shift in rhetoric was not intended to 
 
100  Id. at 744–45 (quoting Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916)). 
101  Id. at 748 (quoting Am. Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260). 
102  Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699 (2006). 
103  Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317 n.5 (2005). 
104  See, e.g., Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 748–49 (“[W]hen federal law creates a private right of action and 
furnishes the substantive rules of decision, . . . district courts possess federal-question jurisdiction under 
§ 1331 . . . unless Congress divests federal courts of their § 1331 adjudicatory authority.”). 
105  Id. at 749 (“[D]ivestment of district court jurisdiction should be found no more readily than 
divestmen[t] of state court jurisdiction, given the longstanding and explicit grant of . . . jurisdiction 
in . . . § 1331. Accordingly, the District Court retains § 1331 jurisdiction over Mims’s complaint unless 
the TCPA . . . excludes [it].” (first and second alterations in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
106  Id. at 748–49. 
107  Id. at 748 n.8. 
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signal a shift in doctrinal focus, the courts should read it as a shift, given the 
gains in jurisprudential and doctrinal coherence and focus upon 
congressional intent that flow from such an approach. 
II. MIMS AND A COHERENT § 1331 CANON 
One overarching reason to praise the Mims Court’s shift in § 1331 
doctrine—or to read the case as if it intends such a jurisprudential shift—is 
that a rights-inclusive presentation of the default § 1331 test renders the 
case law more coherent. Past incantations of the Holmes test by the Court 
as that central element of § 1331 doctrine have not brought clarity. Indeed, 
the federal courts themselves have failed to embrace fully a strict Holmes-
test-only conception of § 1331 jurisdiction.108 This confusion has led some 
courts to complain that § 1331 jurisdiction is more of a “Serbonian Bog”109 
than an easily applied rule, while others lament that “[a]ttempting to define 
an all inclusive test which will determine if a case ‘arises under’ the 
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States is like the exercise 
performed by the daughters of Danaus, condemned for eternity, as they 
were, to draw water with a sieve.”110 Academics have similarly failed to 
settle on a generally agreed-upon approach to § 1331 doctrine,111 noting that 
 
108  See, e.g., Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 314 (“These considerations have kept us from stating a 
‘single, precise, all-embracing’ test for jurisdiction over federal issues embedded in state-law claims 
between nondiverse parties.”); Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 90 (1998) 
(“Jurisdiction . . . is a word of many, too many, meanings . . . .” (quoting United States v. Vanness, 85 
F.3d 661, 663 n.2 (D.C. Cir 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. 
Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (“Since the first version of § 1331 was enacted the 
statutory phrase ‘arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States’ has resisted all 
attempts to frame a single, precise definition . . . .” (citation omitted)); Willy v. Coastal Corp., 855 F.2d 
1160, 1165 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Defining when a claim arises under federal law has drawn much attention 
but no simple solutions.”), aff’d, 503 U.S. 131 (1992); Div. 587, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO 
v. Municipality of Metro. Seattle, 663 F.2d 875, 877 (9th Cir. 1981) (“Commentators on the issue of the 
proper scope of federal question jurisdiction seem agreed on only one proposition: no completely 
satisfactory analytical framework has yet been devised.”); First Nat’l Bank of Aberdeen v. Aberdeen 
Nat’l Bank, 627 F.2d 843, 849 (8th Cir. 1980) (“Formulation of a general test for determining when an 
action ‘arises under’ federal law has eluded the courts for more than a century . . . .”). 
109  Amoco Prod. Co. v. Sea Robin Pipeline Co., 844 F.2d 1202, 1205 (5th Cir. 1988). 
110  Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp. v. Ilsley, 690 F.2d 323, 328 n.4 (2d Cir. 1982), aff’d mem. sub 
nom. Arcudi v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 463 U.S. 1220 (1983). 
111  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 88, at 916 (noting that without the well-pleaded complaint rule, 
more careful thought about federal question jurisdiction would be required); Freer, supra note 65, at 340 
(suggesting that “federal question jurisdiction might be more compelling for questions of law rather than 
application of clearly established law to fact”); Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A 
Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction over Cases of Mixed State and Federal Law, 60 IND. 
L.J. 17, 22 (1984) (“[C]ourts may make sensible judgments about both what is necessary and what is 
sufficient to support federal jurisdiction by returning to the [Holmes] standard . . . of ‘the law that 
creates the cause of action.’”); Ernest J. London, “Federal Question” Jurisdiction—A Snare and a 
Delusion, 57 MICH. L. REV. 835, 835 (1959) (arguing that the federal question criterion is an unsuitable 
test for original jurisdiction); Mishkin, supra note 88, at 168 (“[T]he criterion for original federal 
jurisdiction [is] a substantial claim founded ‘directly’ upon federal law . . . .”); Oakley, supra note 65, at 
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the courts offer competing rubrics for the vesting of federal question 
jurisdiction.112 Some go so far as to reject the notion that § 1331 can be, “or 
should be, [understood in terms of] a single, all-purpose, neutral analytical 
concept which marks out federal question jurisdiction.”113 
As I have argued in prior work, the rhetorical prominence of the 
Holmes test causes much of this confusion.114 If the rhetoric of the Holmes 
test is stripped away, however, the Court’s actual practice in § 1331 cases 
demonstrates that the existence of a federal cause of action is neither a 
necessary,115 per the classic formulation of the Holmes test, nor sufficient,116 
per the modern restatement of the Holmes test, condition for the vesting of 
§ 1331 jurisdiction.117 Rather, as the Mims Court’s rights-inclusive recasting 
of the § 1331 test suggests, the Court takes § 1331 jurisdiction based upon 
an analysis of both the federal origin of the right asserted and the cause of 
action.118 
I turn in this Part, then, to a descriptive claim. Namely, that the Mims 
rights-inclusive approach to the jurisdictional default rule more accurately 
describes the federal courts’ § 1331 decisions than does the Holmes test. 
First, I contend that the Mims approach better accounts for the number of 
cases in which the courts refuse to take § 1331 jurisdiction over federal 
causes of action that are paired with state law rights than does the Holmes 
test. Second, I note that the Mims rights-inclusive approach also offers 
 
1832 (suggesting that the claim is the “fundamental unit of litigation for purposes of federal 
jurisdiction”); Note, Mr. Smith Goes to Federal Court: Federal Question Jurisdiction over State Law 
Claims Post-Merrell Dow, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2272, 2273 (2002) [hereinafter Mr. Smith] (“[S]haping 
the doctrine on the basis of the competencies of and the comity between the federal and state systems 
may best serve the values of federal question jurisdiction while allowing for relatively clear 
jurisdictional rules.”). 
112  See sources cited supra note 65 (discussing the Court’s two-track approach to § 1331 
jurisdiction). 
113  Cohen, supra note 88, at 907; see also Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 314 (admitting that the Court 
has consistently refused to “stat[e] a single, precise, all-embracing test for jurisdiction over federal 
issues embedded in state-law claims between nondiverse parties” (quoting Christianson v. Colt Indus. 
Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 821 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
114  See, e.g., Mulligan, A Unified Theory, supra note 93 (arguing that § 1331 is better understood, 
not via the Holmes test, but as a set of three standards that seek indicia of congressional intent by 
weighing both causes of action and substantive rights); Mulligan, Cross-Reference, supra note 11 
(arguing that the federal courts take federal question jurisdiction, not based upon the Holmes test, but 
finding that they maintain declaratory power over the substantive law); Lumen N. Mulligan, Federal 
Courts Not Federal Tribunals, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 175, 192–208 (2010) (arguing that the Court’s faulty 
anti-inferred cause of action jurisprudence is based upon a reading of the Holmes test). 
115  See, e.g., Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 314; Smith v. Kan. City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 
201–02 (1921). 
116  See, e.g., Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 605, 607–12 (1979); Baker v. 
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218–29 (1962); Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505, 507, 513 (1900). 
117  See Mulligan, A Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1724–25 (providing a summary of this view). 
118  See generally id. (arguing across numerous categories of suits that the Holmes test does not 
describe the Court’s § 1331 practice). 
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greater explanatory power over instances where the courts take § 1331 
jurisdiction over federal causes of action coupled with state law rights than 
does the Holmes test. Third, I note that the Mims approach offers a more 
satisfactory explanation of the courts’ practice of taking § 1331 jurisdiction 
over state law causes of action when coupled with substantial federal rights. 
I contend, therefore, that these many decisions illustrate that the Mims 
approach brings greater descriptive coherence to § 1331 decisions than does 
the Holmes test, which provides a key motivation for the federal courts to 
embrace it. 
A. No Jurisdiction over Federal Causes of Action 
The Court does acknowledge that the Holmes test is best viewed as a 
rule of inclusion for § 1331 jurisdiction.119 In so doing, it stresses that the 
presence of a federal cause of action is a “sufficient condition for federal-
question jurisdiction,”120 while recognizing that there are a few rare 
exceptions to this rule.121 In this section, I argue that the Court’s practice 
does not support the view that failure to take § 1331 jurisdiction in the face 
of a federal cause of action is anomalous. Indeed, within the set of cases in 
which a federal cause of action is paired with a mandatory application of a 
state law right, the courts uniformly decline § 1331 jurisdiction. First, I 
address the Shoshone Mining Co. line of cases. Second, I review the courts’ 
practice under the Miller Act, where § 1331 jurisdiction does not vest over 
federal causes of action coupled with state law contractual rights. Third, I 
review the courts’ treatment of Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) cases 
under § 1331. Finally, I note that the courts will not take § 1331 jurisdiction 
over federal causes of action coupled with procedural, as opposed to 
substantive, rights. As such, the Mims approach to § 1331, which looks to 
both causes of action and rights to vest jurisdiction, more readily describes 
these cases than does the Holmes test. 
1. The Shoshone Mining Co. Line of Cases.—Contrary to its “rare 
exception” rhetoric, the Court consistently refuses to take § 1331 
jurisdiction over cases involving mandatory application of state law rights 
when Congress creates a federal cause of action to enforce them.122 The lead 
case is Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter.123 There, the Court refused § 1331 
jurisdiction over a suit in which Congress had created a cause of action to 
adjudicate state law property rights to mines.124 Of importance, the Court 
 
119  See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 809 n.5 (1986) (quoting T. B. 
Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 827 (2d Cir. 1964)). 
120  Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 317; see also Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., 132 S. Ct. 740, 748 
(2012). 
121  See Mims, 132 S. Ct. at 748 n.8; Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 317 n.5. 
122  See Mulligan, Cross-Reference, supra note 11, at 1196–1200. 
123  177 U.S. 505 (1900). 
124  Id. at 513. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
 258 
found that because the statute mandated that state or territorial law would 
provide the rule of decision in these cases, § 1331 jurisdiction did not 
arise.125 This result followed from the state law status of the substantive law 
at issue because “the right of possession may not involve any question 
under the . . . laws of the United States, but simply a determination of local 
rules . . . or state statutes, or . . . a mere matter of fact.”126 That is to say, the 
Court declined statutory federal question jurisdiction because it lacked the 
power to construct definitively the state law at issue127 and refused to be 
deployed as a mere fact finder, even though, contrary to the Holmes test, 
Congress created the cause of action. 
Shoshone is not a lone case, despite the Court’s statements to that 
effect.128 For example, in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,129 the Court clearly 
held that, despite the Holmes test, the focus for § 1331 jurisdiction is the 
assertion of a federal right—not a federal cause of action.130 There Puerto 
Rico sought to collect a tax debt in court because a federal statute required 
the collection of such claims by a suit at law, as opposed to an attachment 
proceeding, and it created a federal cause of action to do so.131 Puerto Rico 
began a suit at law in the Puerto Rican courts to collect the tax.132 The 
defendant removed to federal district court, relying upon the Holmes test, 
contending that the case arose under § 1331.133 Declining federal question 
jurisdiction, the Court held that § 1331 may only be “invoked to vindicate a 
right or privilege claimed under a federal statute. It may not be invoked 
where the right asserted is non-federal, merely because the plaintiff’s right 
to sue is derived from federal law . . . .”134 The Court further reasoned that 
“[t]he federal nature of the right to be established is decisive [for 
jurisdictional purposes]—not the source of the authority to establish it.”135 
The Court has relied upon this same anti-Holmes-test theory of § 1331 
jurisdiction in at least three other cases. In Jackson Transit Authority v. 
Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union,136 the Court considered 
whether claims brought under the Urban Mass Transportation Act, which 
 
125  Id. at 508. 
126  Id. 
127  See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 914–16 (1997) (“Neither this Court nor any other 
federal tribunal has any authority to place a construction on a state statute different from the one 
rendered by the highest court of the State.”). 
128  See Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 317 n.5 (2005) 
(recognizing Shoshone as an exception, though a limited one, to the Holmes test). 
129  288 U.S. 476 (1933). 
130  Id. at 483–84. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. at 477. 
133  Id. at 477–78. 
134  Id. at 483. 
135  Id. 
136  457 U.S. 15 (1982). 
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creates a federal cause of action, arise under § 1331. The Court held they do 
not because the statute mandated that the rule of decision in these suits was 
to be determined by state law.137 Similarly, in Gully v. First National 
Bank,138 the Court refused statutory federal question jurisdiction over a suit 
to collect state taxes from a nationally chartered bank, despite the existence 
of a federal statute allowing the levy of such a tax, reasoning that “the 
federal nature of the right to be established is decisive—not the source of 
the authority to establish it.”139 And earlier, in Shulthis v. McDougal,140 the 
Court held that a congressionally created equitable quiet title cause of 
action lacked statutory federal question jurisdiction because the right to the 
land in question was controlled by state law.141 The courts of appeals have 
also relied upon this rights-focused § 1331 analysis.142 
The Mims theory of § 1331 jurisdiction, with its dual focus on rights 
and causes of action, can incorporate such cases into the jurisprudential 
canon better than the Holmes test. From the Holmes test perspective, these 
cases simply must stand as exceptions to the default rule.143 Looking to both 
rights and causes of action to divine statutory federal question jurisdiction, 
as the Mims opinion instructs, demonstrates the lack of a substantial issue of 
federal law in such cases. As Shoshone Mining Co. held, mere “recognition 
by Congress of local customs and statutory provisions as at times 
controlling . . . does not incorporate them into the body of Federal law.”144 
2. The Miller Act Cases.—The courts provide a similar jurisdictional 
treatment for suits brought under the Miller Act, where courts refuse to take 
§ 1331 jurisdiction over federal causes of action when coupled with state 
law rights.145 Because sovereign immunity bars the placing of a mechanic’s 
lien upon federal construction projects,146 Congress passed the Miller Act, 
 
137  Id. at 29. 
138  299 U.S. 109 (1936). 
139  Id. at 114 (quoting Puerto Rico, 288 U.S. at 483). 
140  225 U.S. 561 (1912). 
141  Id. at 569–70. 
142  See, e.g., Bay Shore Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Kain, 485 F.3d 730, 735 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding 
that the federal courts lacked § 1331 jurisdiction because the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
empowered the plaintiff to sue but the rights at issue were entirely a matter of state law); City Nat’l 
Bank v. Edmisten, 681 F.2d 942, 945–46 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the National Bank Act “is not a 
sufficient basis for federal question jurisdiction simply because it incorporates state law” when the Act 
makes usury, as defined by local state law, illegal, and the nondiverse parties were only contesting the 
meaning of North Carolina’s usury law); Standage Ventures, Inc. v. Arizona, 499 F.2d 248, 250 (9th 
Cir. 1974) (holding no federal question arises where “the real substance of the controversy . . . turns 
entirely upon disputed questions of law and fact relating to compliance with state law, and not at all 
upon the meaning or effect of the federal statute itself”). 
143  See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
144  177 U.S. 505, 508 (1900). 
145  This section builds on prior research. See Mulligan, Cross Reference, supra note 11, at 1215–18. 
146  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Hill v. Am. Sur. Co., 200 U.S. 197, 203 (1906) (“As against the 
United States, no lien can be provided upon its public buildings or grounds, and it was the purpose of 
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which requires general contractors to post a payment bond at the beginning 
of construction to satisfy unpaid claims to suppliers and subcontractors147 as 
a substitute remedy for subcontractors to effectuate relief for breaches of 
contract by general contractors.148 Under the Act, subcontractors may sue 
the general contractor for breach and, because of the bond, be assured that 
the general contractor will not become judgment proof. The Miller Act 
directs that the federal district courts retain exclusive jurisdiction of these 
cases with the United States serving as the nominal plaintiff for the benefit 
of the injured subcontractor.149 
Like the Shoshone Mining Co. line of cases, the Miller Act creates a 
statutory federal cause of action.150 The nature of the underlying contract 
right in Miller Act suits remains the source of some confusion. Before 
1974, the courts consistently held that the Miller Act mandated that state 
law supply contract rights in such actions.151 Following the anti-Holmes 
approach of the Shoshone Mining Co. cases, the federal courts did not take 
§ 1331 jurisdiction over Miller Act cases at that time, but rather found 
jurisdiction because the United States was a party plaintiff.152 
 
this act to substitute the obligation of a bond for the security which might otherwise be obtained by 
attaching a lien to the property of an individual.”). 
147  Ch. 642, 49 Stat. 793 (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C. §§ 3131–3134 (2006)). 
148  See, e.g., § 3131(b)(2) (requiring posting of payment bond); United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 
332 U.S. 234, 241 (1947) (“But nothing is more clear than that laborers and materialmen do not have 
enforceable rights against the United States for their compensation. They cannot acquire a lien on public 
buildings, and as a substitute for that more customary protection, the various statutes were passed which 
require that a surety guarantee their payment.” (citations omitted)). 
149  § 3133(b)(3)(A); Blanchard v. Terry & Wright, Inc., 331 F.2d 467, 469 (6th Cir. 1964) 
(“Exclusive jurisdiction in the District Court was expressly conferred by the Miller Act.”). 
150  § 3133(b)(1) (“Every person that has furnished labor or material in carrying out work provided 
for in a contract for which a payment bond is furnished . . . and that has not been paid in full . . . may 
bring a civil action on the payment bond for the amount unpaid at the time the civil action is brought and 
may prosecute the action to final execution and judgment for the amount due.”). 
151  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Shields, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 367 F.2d 473, 477 (4th 
Cir. 1966) (“We agree that the substantive law of North Carolina must be applied in determining the 
respective rights of the parties. Even though jurisdiction is conferred by the Miller Act, the construction 
of that statute is not at issue and all acts relevant to the subcontract in question and its performance 
occurred in North Carolina.”); Wells Benz, Inc. v. United States ex rel. Mercury Elec. Co., 333 F.2d 89, 
92 n.3 (9th Cir. 1964) (applying California law in a Miller Act case); United States ex rel. Ascher Corp. 
v. Bradley-Dodson Co., 281 F.2d 676, 681 (8th Cir. 1960) (applying Nebraska law in a Miller Act case); 
Am. Auto Ins. Co. v. United States ex rel. Luce, 269 F.2d 406, 411–12 (1st Cir. 1959) (applying Maine 
law in a Miller Act case). 
152  See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Allsop Lumber Co., 336 F.2d 445, 449 (8th Cir. 1964) (holding that 
amount in controversy requirement of $10,000 then required under both 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332 
was inapplicable because “the Miller Act provides another and different basis for federal court 
jurisdiction because it requires that the action be brought in the name of the United States”); United 
States ex rel. Sligh v. Fullerton Constr. Co., 296 F. Supp. 518, 522 (D.S.C. 1968) (finding the Miller Act 
provided a basis for jurisdiction), aff’d, 407 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1969); United States ex rel. Betts v. 
Cont’l Cas. Co., 224 F. Supp. 857, 860 (W.D. Pa. 1964); 6A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 1551, at 
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In F. D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co.,153 the 
Court held that the Miller Act provides for attorney’s fees.154 In so ruling, 
the Court stated that “[t]he Miller Act provides a federal cause of action, 
and the scope of the remedy as well as the substance of the rights created 
thereby is a matter of federal not state law.”155 As a result of this language, 
some lower courts now hold that federal common law governs contractual 
rights under the Miller Act as opposed to mandatory application of state 
law.156 Other lower courts limit the F. D. Rich federal common law 
interpretation of the Miller Act to procedural issues, while continuing to 
view the contractual rights as governed by mandatory application of state 
law.157 Finding § 1331 jurisdiction, as opposed to mere United-States-as-a-
party jurisdiction, often matters for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction 
and the like.158 
 
542 n.8 (2010) (citing pre-F. D. Rich cases for the proposition that Miller Act suits take federal 
jurisdiction because the United States is a party). 
153  417 U.S. 116 (1974). 
154  Id. at 121. 
155  Id. at 127. 
156  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Lighting & Power Servs., Inc. v. Interface Constr. Corp., 553 F.3d 
1150, 1153 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting F. D. Rich, 417 U.S. at 127, and holding that federal law governs 
the substantive contractual rights at issue in a Miller Act case); id. at 1155 (exclusively citing Missouri 
contract law on contractual interpretation issue in a Miller Act case); Towerridge, Inc. v. T.A.O., Inc., 
111 F.3d 758, 764 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting, after applying state law as a matter of discretion, that “we 
clearly, and repeatedly, [have] stated prejudgment interest awards on Miller Act claims are governed by 
federal law, not state law”); United States ex rel. A. V. DeBlasio Constr., Inc. v. Mountain States Constr. 
Co., 588 F.2d 259, 262 n.1 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[T]he Court has also held that when no such [federal–state] 
policy conflict exists, the federal courts may look to state law in fashioning substantive federal rules.”). 
157  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Pertun Constr. Co. v. Harvesters Grp., Inc., 918 F.2d 915, 919 
(11th Cir. 1990) (“Although this action was brought under the Miller Act, the effect and validity of the 
contractual clause purportedly limiting the subcontractor’s remedy for delay is governed by the law of 
Florida, the state in which the agreement was executed and was to be performed.”); United States ex rel. 
M-CO Constr., Inc. v. Shipco Gen., Inc., 814 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1987) (“In a Miller Act case, 
state law determines the amount of damages a subcontractor may receive.”); United States ex rel. 
Aucoin Elec. Supply Co. v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 555 F.2d 535, 541 (5th Cir. 1977) (“In this aspect 
[whether there was a material breach], Texas law would be applicable. The issue does not involve any 
construction of the Miller Act, to which federal law would apply, but involves performance in Texas of 
a contract made in Texas.”); United States ex rel. Greenmoor, Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 
Civ. No. 06-234, 2007 WL 2071651, at *3 (W.D. Pa. July 13, 2007) (“Congress provided that the 
United States district courts have ‘exclusive federal question jurisdiction’ for actions under the Miller 
Act. . . . [H]owever, the underlying breach of contract claims that form the basis of the Miller Act claim 
will be determined on the basis of state law.”); United States ex rel. Endicott Enters. Inc. v. Star Brite 
Constr. Co., 848 F. Supp. 1161, 1168 (D. Del. 1994) (“In actions brought under the Miller Act, issues 
not involving the construction of the [Miller] Act [itself], such as ordinary contract issues, will be 
resolved by the law of the state where the contract is performed.”). 
158  See, e.g., Arena v. Graybar Elec. Co., 669 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2012) (treating the Miller Act 
as arising under § 1331 jurisdiction and using the same as the foundation for a supplemental jurisdiction 
analysis); Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co., 189 F.3d 512, 515 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(Posner, J.) (accepting that Miller Act claims arise under § 1331 for purposes of determining whether 
procedural rules unique to admiralty law apply); see also Katz v. Cisneros, 16 F.3d 1204, 1207 (Fed. 
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Importantly, this circuit split regarding whether the federal courts are 
to use state law or federal common law to supply the rule of decision under 
the Miller Act coincides with the courts’ taking of jurisdiction under § 1331 
in Miller Act cases.159 That is, contrary to the Holmes test, the federal courts 
did not take § 1331 jurisdiction over Miller Act claims before 1974—when 
they were conceived of as federal causes of action coupled with a 
mandatory application of state law rules of decision—yet now that such 
claims are thought to invoke federal common law rules of decision the 
courts often take § 1331 jurisdiction. Only a theory of § 1331 jurisdiction 
that considers the nature of the substantive rights at issue, such as is 
advanced by the Mims Court, adequately explains this state of affairs.160 
3. Federal Tort Claims Act Cases.—The FTCA161 presents another 
set of cases in which, contrary to the Holmes test, the federal courts often 
refuse § 1331 jurisdiction even though Congress has created a federal cause 
of action.162 The FTCA waives the federal government’s sovereign 
immunity for certain vicarious liability tort claims resulting from federal 
 
Cir. 1994) (“Even where a case is contractual . . . the presence of issues which require the interpretation 
of federal law and regulation necessarily give rise to federal questions.” (citing Conille v. Sec’y of Hous. 
& Urban Dev., 840 F.2d 105, 109 (1st Cir. 1988))); N. Side Lumber Co. v. Block, 753 F.2d 1482, 1484 
(9th Cir. 1985) (noting that a claim that enforcing a contract would violate a federal statute arises under 
federal law for purposes of § 1331). 
159  See, e.g., United States ex rel. Balzer Pac. Equip. Co. v. Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md., 895 F.2d 
546, 547 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding, in a circuit that takes a federal common law approach to Miller Act 
claims, that jurisdiction arises under § 1331); United States ex rel. LVI Envtl. Servs., Inc. v. Hunt Bldg. 
Co., No. 09-cv-02532-WYD-BNB, 2009 WL 4730488, at *1 (D. Colo. Dec. 8, 2009) (same); United 
States ex rel. Sheet Metal Eng’g, Inc. v. Job Shops Co., No. 4:05-cv-00080-RAW, 2006 WL 4005634, at 
*1 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 14, 2006). 
160  See supra note 11 and accompanying text (outlining that federal question jurisdiction requires 
that the federal courts be vested with declaratory power of the substantive law invoked, not mere 
interpretive power). 
161  Ch. 171, 62 Stat. 982 (1948) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). 
162  The presence of the United States as defendant in FTCA actions would appear to moot the need 
for federal question jurisdiction. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing, as enacted by statute, subject 
matter jurisdiction over “Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party”). But the Court for 
several decades held that this provision only applied to the United States as a plaintiff party, requiring 
jurisdiction over the United States as a party defendant to arise as federal questions. See Williams v. 
United States, 289 U.S. 553, 577 (1933) (holding on original intent grounds, as further expressed in the 
Judiciary Act of 1789, that U.S. party jurisdiction only extends to the United States as a plaintiff). Most 
courts and commentators find this portion of Williams overturned by the plurality opinion in Glidden 
Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 564 (1962) (Harlan, J., plurality opinion). See, e.g., Kanar v. United States, 
118 F.3d 527, 529 (7th Cir. 1997) (“No one today doubts that Article III courts may entertain suits 
against the United States seeking money damages. . . . Williams . . . [was] repudiated in Glidden . . . .” 
(citations omitted)). “Despite the fact that Glidden overturned Williams, for the thirty years that it 
remained good law, Williams pushed jurists to find another basis for constitutional jurisdiction over 
cases, like FTCA suits, in which the United States was a party defendant—a path that led many to 
conclude that jurisdiction for such cases arises as federal questions” post-Glidden. Mulligan, Cross-
Reference, supra note 11, at 1207. 
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employees’ actions.163 As a result, when immunity is not extended, the 
FTCA renders the government defendant subject to liability as if it were a 
private entity.164 Furthering the goal of treating the government like a 
private entity, the Act requires the application of state law as the rule of 
decision.165 In applying this provision, the Court holds that the FTCA 
“requires application of the whole law of the State where the act or 
omission occurred.”166 As such, the Court holds “that federal courts should 
not create interstitial federal common law [in FTCA suits].”167 Under the 
FTCA, then, the federal courts are strictly bound to apply state law168 as the 
controlling rule of decision169 as a matter of statutory command. At the 
same time, the Court has twice ruled that the FTCA creates a federal cause 
of action over these state law rights.170 Thus, FTCA suits, like Shoshone 
 
163  See Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 6 (1962) (holding that the FTCA removes sovereign 
immunity). 
164  28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2006). 
165  The Supreme Court has been remarkably consistent in holding that § 1346(b)’s reference to the 
“law of the place” means the law of the State. See, e.g., Miree v. DeKalb Cnty., 433 U.S. 25, 29 n.4 
(1977); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 153 (1963); Richards, 369 U.S. at 6–7, 11; Rayonier Inc. 
v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318 (1957). I am putting aside complicated questions of which law 
applies under the FTCA if a tort occurs in Indian Country or in a federal enclave. See, e.g., J. Matthew 
Martin, Federal Malpractice in Indian Country and the “Law of the Place”: A Re-Examination of 
Williams v. United States Under Existing Law of the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 29 CAMPBELL 
L. REV. 483 (2007) (arguing that tribal law should apply in FTCA cases when torts occur in Indian 
Country). The Court has only once contemplated the application of federal common law as the rule of 
decision in an FTCA case. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1993). Smith is unique, 
however, in that the alleged torts occurred in Antarctica, where state law does not govern and, arguably, 
no sovereign’s law applies. Id. The Court, however, avoided this difficulty by holding that Antarctica 
was a foreign country within the meaning of the FTCA’s foreign-country exception to tort liability. Id. at 
203–04. 
166  Richards, 369 U.S. at 11 (holding that state law controls choice of law issues, as well as 
substantive tort law, in FTCA cases). 
167  Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 105 n.8 (1971); see also Birnbaum v. United States, 588 
F.2d 319, 327–28 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Congress expressly negated any possible inference that federal courts 
were to exercise any ‘common law-making’ power to fashion torts under the Act in the interest of 
national uniformity.”). One district court decision holds to the contrary, but the vast weight of authority 
suggests this holding is in error. See S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. United States, 462 F. Supp. 1193, 1210 (E.D. 
Cal. 1978) (holding that the view that “the FTCA requires the application of state law operative of its 
own force . . . is erroneous; instead, the Act provides for the application of state law incorporated into 
federal law as the federal rule of decision”). 
168  See, e.g., Bravo v. United States, 532 F.3d 1154, 1164 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are bound to 
decide the issue the way the Florida courts would have . . . .”); Arpin v. United States, 521 F.3d 769, 776 
(7th Cir. 2008) (applying state law to determine damages); Goodman v. United States, 2 F.3d 291, 292 
(8th Cir. 1993) (applying the state law of the state in which the acts occurred). 
169  See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 478 (1994) (holding that claims of federal constitutional 
violations are not cognizable under the FTCA because under the FTCA, state law provides the sole font 
of substantive law). 
170  See Loeffler v. Frank, 486 U.S. 549, 562 (1988) (explaining that § 2679(a) limits the scope of 
waivers “in the context of suits for which [Congress] provided a cause of action under the FTCA” 
(emphasis added)); Meyer, 510 U.S. at 477 (quoting this language from Loeffler and speaking in terms 
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Mining Co. and pre-1974 Miller Act cases, present the § 1331 jurisdictional 
question against the backdrop of federal causes of action coupled with 
mandatory applications of state law rights.171 
Despite the clear case that FTCA claims should arise under § 1331 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Holmes test, confusion reigns in regard to the 
statutory basis for jurisdiction under the FTCA.172 Some lower federal 
courts, for example, hold that FTCA cases take jurisdiction under both 
§ 1346(b), the FTCA’s jurisdictional statute, and § 1331.173 While these 
opinions tend to take § 1331 jurisdiction without much discussion, given 
the ubiquity of Holmes test rhetoric, the assumption that these courts are 
deploying the test sub silentio is not without merit.174 Other courts hold that 
jurisdiction to hear FTCA claims, because the government is a party, does 
“not come from the general grant of federal-question jurisdiction of 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.”175 
Significantly, those courts that decline § 1331 jurisdiction over FTCA 
cases do so by focusing, as the Mims decision instructs, upon the nature of 
 
of statutory elements of an FTCA claim); see also Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 341 
F.3d 571, 576 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (similar); Dorking Genetics v. United States, 76 F.3d 1261, 1264 (2d Cir. 
1996) (similar); Fred Blanton, Jurisdictional Problems of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 13 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 511, 513–15 (1952) (arguing that federal law creates the plaintiffs’ cause of action in FTCA cases). 
Not all courts of appeals, however, accept the Supreme Court’s characterization of the FTCA. See, e.g., 
CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 143 n.7 (3d Cir. 2008) (“[Section] 1346(b)(1) grants federal courts 
jurisdiction and also allows plaintiffs to bring state-law causes of action . . . .”); Dorking Genetics, 76 
F.3d at 1266 (similar); Johnson v. Sawyer, 47 F.3d 716, 725 (5th Cir. 1995) (similar). 
171  FTCA suits do differ, however, from the Shoshone Mining Co. cases in that FTCA suits have an 
alternative ground for federal jurisdiction in that the United States is a party to FTCA suits. See infra 
note 172. In this regard, FTCA suits mirror Miller Act suits. 
172  See generally 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 14, § 3563, at 225 n.26 (“There is debate about 
whether suits under the Federal Tort Claims Act . . . are federal question cases or whether . . . they come 
under the constitutional grant of judicial power to ‘Controversies to which the United States shall be a 
party.’”). 
173  See, e.g., Luna v. United States, 454 F.3d 631, 635 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Navy characterizes this 
as a question of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is not. The district court had subject-matter jurisdiction 
because Luna brought her claim under the FTCA, which is to say she presented the district court with a 
federal question.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006))); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Liberatore, 408 F.3d 
1158, 1161–62 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding jurisdiction under both the FTCA and § 1331); Fla. E. Coast Ry. 
Co. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1194 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that raising an FTCA claim also 
raises a “substantial federal question”); U.S. Marine, Inc. v. United States, Civ. No. 08-2571, 2010 WL 
1403958, at *4 (E.D. La. Apr. 1, 2010) (“The Court has subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331 (federal question) and 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq. (Federal Tort Claims Act).”); see also Hankes v. 
United States, No. 08-CV-333-JHP-TLW, 2010 WL 2196561, at *1 (N.D. Okla. May 27, 2010) 
(“Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671 et seq., invoking 
federal question jurisdiction.”). 
174  See supra note 96 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence of the Holmes test). 
175  CNA v. United States, 535 F.3d 132, 140 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Gilberg v. Stepan Co., 24 F. 
Supp. 2d 325, 346 (D.N.J. 1998) (“When Congress granted the federal courts original (and exclusive) 
jurisdiction over Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) actions, it did so under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), not 
section 1331.”). 
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the federal right at issue in FTCA suits. Such a rights-based focus 
demonstrates that standard application of the well-pleaded complaint rule 
bars § 1331 jurisdiction over FTCA suits.176 The FTCA is merely a limited 
waiver of sovereign immunity to state law rights.177 Although the waiver of 
immunity is of a jurisdictional dimension, it is, as a procedural matter, a 
defense.178 As a result, the existence of a federal sovereign immunity 
defense, following the well-pleaded complaint rule, will not vest § 1331 
jurisdiction.179 As a result, a claim that the FTCA bars or allows a suit 
should not survive a well-pleaded complaint rule challenge to § 1331 
jurisdiction.180 The Mims approach, with its inclusion of both federal causes 
of action and rights into the default § 1331 analysis, therefore, offers greater 
explanatory power to FTCA jurisdictional disputes than does a strict 
application of the Holmes test because Mims aides in the illustration that 
FTCA cases only substantively raise federal law as a defense. The Holmes 
test’s myopic focus on the federal cause of action, however, overlooks this 
 
176  See Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (establishing the well-
pleaded complaint rule, which holds that only matters in the complaint, not defenses, may give rise to 
§ 1331 federal questions). 
177  United States v. Orleans, 425 U.S. 807, 813 (1976) (“The Federal Tort Claims Act is a limited 
waiver of sovereign immunity, making the Federal Government liable to the same extent as a private 
party for certain torts of federal employees acting within the scope of their employment.”). 
178  The Court regularly treats federal sovereign immunity as a defense. See, e.g., United States v. 
Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 337 U.S. 426, 462 (1949) (“The defense of sovereign immunity, 
moreover, cannot be avoided by directing that the suit proceed only against the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.” (emphasis added)); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (discussing the 
sovereign immunity defense and jurisdiction). The courts of appeals have aptly labeled these 
jurisdictional defenses. See, e.g., Hydrogen Tech. Corp. v. United States, 831 F.2d 1155, 1162 n.6 (1st 
Cir. 1987) (“It is well-established law that . . . jurisdictional defenses cannot be waived by the parties 
and may be raised for the first time on appeal or even raised by a court sua sponte.”); see also Roberts v. 
United States, 887 F.2d 899, 900 (9th Cir. 1989) (similar). 
179  Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1983) (holding that 
the presence of a federal immunity defense, even if pleaded on the face of the complaint, is not sufficient 
to bring a claim within § 1331 jurisdiction). 
180  See, e.g., Gilberg, 24 F. Supp. 2d at 346–47 (holding that under the well-pleaded complaint rule, 
“such a claim [would not] fall within 28 U.S.C. § 1331’s grant of jurisdiction . . . because the federal 
agency or employee could raise an immunity defense under the FTCA’s exclusive remedy provision”); 
see also Sanchez v. Beacon Info. Tech. & Staffing & Serv., LLC, No. EP-08-CV-332-KC, 2009 WL 
4877705, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 10, 2009) (similar). There is some confusion regarding whether the 
exceptions to the FTCA’s waiver of immunity, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2680, constitute jurisdictional 
issues or affirmative defenses for the government. Two circuits view this as a defense. See Prescott v. 
United States, 973 F.2d 696, 702 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Because an exception to the FTCA’s general waiver 
of immunity, although jurisdictional on its face, is analogous to an affirmative defense . . . .”); Stewart v. 
United States, 199 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 1952) (similar). Three circuits have adopted a contrary 
holding. See Sharp v. United States, 401 F.3d 440, 443 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that Prescott may 
conflict with United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. 315 (1991), and declining to address whether the 
plaintiff or the Government has the burden of proving the FTCA’s discretionary function exception); 
Autery v. United States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1526 n.6 (11th Cir. 1993) (same); Kiehn v. United States, 984 
F.2d 1100, 1105 n.7 (10th Cir. 1993) (same). 
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nuance because it takes jurisdiction merely on a federal cause of action that 
raises no substantive federal law in the complaint. 
4. Suits to Enforce Procedural Rights.—Further reinforcing my 
descriptive thesis that the Mims approach better describes § 1331 
jurisdiction than does the Holmes test, I turn now to a brief review of cases 
where the Court refuses to take § 1331 jurisdiction over claims that couple 
procedural federal rights with a federal cause of action such as 42 U.S.C 
§ 1983.181 Section 1983 creates a federal statutory cause of action for the 
violation of federal rights by state officials, but it does not create rights 
themselves.182 Thus, § 1983 cases present instances where only the validity 
of the federal right asserted is at issue—not the existence of a 
congressionally created cause of action. A straightforward application of the 
Holmes test, of course, should take jurisdiction over any federal cause of 
action, even to enforce procedural rights. These cases again show the 
weakness of the Holmes test as an explanatory device. 
The federal courts, deploying a rights-focused theory of § 1331 
jurisdiction akin to the Mims approach, consistently decline § 1331 
jurisdiction when plaintiffs couple procedural federal rights with a § 1983 
cause of action. For instance, when a plaintiff attempts to use the All Writs 
Act,183 a choice of law statute,184 or a rule of procedure185 to vest federal 
question jurisdiction, the federal courts will not find that § 1331 jurisdiction 
arises. Similarly, the Court holds that suits to enforce the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause of the Constitution do not arise under § 1331186 because the 
 
181  See Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 34 (2002) (“The All Writs Act, alone or in 
combination with the existence of ancillary jurisdiction in a federal court, is not a substitute for that 
[§ 1331] requirement.”); Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979) (finding that 
§ 1983 can be used to show that an action is “authorized by law,” but that the act itself does not “provide 
any rights at all”); see also Mulligan, A Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1686, 1725–26 (outlining my 
rights-focused, unified approach to § 1331 jurisdiction). 
182  Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 404 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Section 1983 creates no 
new substantive rights; it merely provides a federal cause of action for the violation of federal rights that 
are independently established either in the Federal Constitution or in federal statutory law.” (citation 
omitted)). 
183  See, e.g., Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 32–34. 
184  See, e.g., Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 689 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that the Parental 
Kidnapping Prevention Act does not create colorable rights but rather provides a choice of law rule and 
as such the court lacks jurisdiction). 
185  See, e.g., Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Merely invoking the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure [Rule 60(b)] is not sufficient grounds to establish federal question 
jurisdiction.”); Milan Express, Inc. v. Averitt Express, Inc., 208 F.3d 975, 979 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding 
in regard to Rule 65.1 that a “federal rule cannot be the basis of original jurisdiction”); Cresswell v. 
Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 70 (2d Cir. 1990) (“The Rules do not provide an independent ground 
for subject matter jurisdiction over an action for which there is no other basis for jurisdiction.”); Port 
Drum Co. v. Umphrey, 852 F.2d 148, 150 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the court lacks jurisdiction to 
hear a suit directly under Rule 11). 
186  See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 182 (1988); Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 
72 (1904). 
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Clause does not create substantive rights, but rather provides a res judicata 
rule (i.e., a procedural rule) for state courts.187 Similarly, the Court holds 
that suits brought to enforce the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution do 
not arise under § 1331, even when Congress supplies a federal cause of 
action.188 As the Court reasoned, the “Clause is not a source of any federal 
rights,” but rather a choice of law rule for cases of conflict between state 
and federal law.189 Again, the Holmes test simply cannot account for such 
rulings, while the Mims approach, with its rights-inclusive focus, 
accommodates these suits and their rights-based discussions into the 
standard § 1331 canon readily. 
B. Explaining the Taking of Jurisdiction over Federal Causes of Action 
Paired with State Law Rights 
In addition to offering a justificatory backdrop for the many suits in 
which the existence of a federal cause of action does not vest § 1331 
jurisdiction, the Mims rights-inclusive approach offers a platform to 
coherently explain suits in which the courts do take statutory federal 
question jurisdiction over federal causes of action coupled with state law 
rules of decision. In this section, I look to two scenarios where such a 
combination occurs: Tucker Act cases and enclave jurisdiction cases. A 
strict Holmes test approach, focusing only upon the federal cause of action, 
cannot divine a meaningful distinction between these cases and the 
Shoshone Mining Co., Miller Act, FTCA, and procedural rights cases. The 
Mims approach, with its inclusion of the nature of federal rights into the 
§ 1331 analysis, provides the doctrinal space to distinguish these sets of 
cases based upon the force with which these applications of state law rights 
are made. 
1. Tucker Acts Cases.—I begin with the Tucker Act190 and the so-
called Little Tucker Act191 where the Holmes test, once again, fails to 
adequately account for the jurisdictional practice of the courts. Under the 
Tucker Act, the Court of Federal Claims has original jurisdiction of any 
 
187  Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182–83 (“Rather, the Clause only prescribes a rule by which courts, 
Federal and state, are to be guided when a question arises in the progress of a pending suit as to the faith 
and credit to be given by the court to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of a State other 
than that in which the court is sitting.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
188  See, e.g., Chapman v. Hous. Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 612–15 (1979) (holding that 
there is no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim 
alleging a violation of the Supremacy Clause); Virgin v. Cnty. of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 
1144–45 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a plaintiff does not have a cause of action directly under the 
Supremacy Clause and that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as a 
result). 
189  Chapman, 441 U.S. at 613. 
190  Ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505 (1887) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006)). 
191  § 1346(a)(2). 
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civil action or claim against the United States, exceeding $10,000, founded 
either upon federal law, contract, or tort.192 Under the Little Tucker Act, the 
federal district courts have original jurisdiction, concurrent with the Court 
of Federal Claims, for similar claims of less than $10,000.193 (I will refer to 
the Tucker and Little Tucker Acts collectively as the Tucker Acts.) 
The Tucker Acts present cases in which federal causes of action are 
coupled with state law causes of action. The Tucker Acts are jurisdictional 
provisions that waive sovereign immunity.194 Unlike the FTCA, the Tucker 
Acts do not provide that the United States is to be dealt with as if it were a 
“private person.”195 In line with their statutory directives,196 contract claims 
brought under the Tucker Acts are governed by federal common law rules 
of decision,197 contrary to practice under the FTCA and the Miller Act. 
Although these contract claims brought under the Tucker Acts are governed 
by federal common law, the federal courts uniformly choose state law 
contract rights as the rule of decision in such cases.198 
 
192  § 1491. The Little Tucker Act set the $10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement by reserving 
concurrent district court jurisdiction for cases under that threshold. 
193  § 1346(a)(2). 
194  See, e.g., United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400–02 (1976); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. 
United States, 27 F.3d 1545, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
195  Compare § 1346(b) (employing private person language), with § 1346(a) (lacking private person 
language). See also Malman v. United States, 207 F.2d 897, 898 (2d Cir. 1953) (making this 
distinction). 
196  See Woodbury v. United States, 313 F.2d 291, 295 (9th Cir. 1963) (noting that lack of the 
“private person” language in the Tucker Acts supports the application of federal common law to contract 
claims under the Tucker Act). 
197  See Nat’l Presto Indus., Inc. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99, 111 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (en banc) 
(“[F]ederal courts can and should proceed under the Tucker Act . . . to develop and establish just and 
practical principles of contract law for the Federal Government.”); see also XTRA Lease, Inc. v. United 
States, 50 Fed. Cl. 612, 621 (2001) (similar); Cegers v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 615, 621 n.10 (1985) 
(similar). The Court has made similar pronouncements regarding government contracts often, but not in 
the context of Tucker Act cases. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988); 
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592–94 (1973); United States v. Seckinger, 
397 U.S. 203, 209–10 (1970); Nat’l Metro. Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454, 456 (1945); United 
States v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 
363, 366 (1943). 
198  See, e.g., Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Se., Inc. v. United States, 530 U.S. 604, 607 
(2000) (“When the United States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are governed 
generally by the law applicable to contracts between private individuals.”); United States v. Winstar 
Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 895 (1996) (plurality opinion) (making the same statement in a Tucker Act suit in 
which the Court refused to apply sovereign-only rules to a government contract); United States v. 
Bostwick, 94 U.S. 53, 66 (1876) (“The United States, when they contract with their citizens, are 
controlled by the same laws that govern the citizen in that behalf.”); Ginsberg v. Austin, 968 F.2d 1198, 
1200 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (similar); Cal. Or. Broad., Inc. v. United States, 74 Fed. Cl. 394, 399 (2006) (same 
in a Tucker Act suit). The Court takes this view of contract enforcement, that state law provides the rule 
of decision, in non-Tucker Act cases as well. See Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 
U.S. 677, 691–92 (2006) (“In post-Clearfield decisions . . . we have recognized, [it] is often [prudent] to 
adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal rule of decision . . . .” (internal quotation marks 
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Contrary to the practice under the Shoshone Mining Co., Miller Act, 
and FTCA lines of cases, however, many federal courts take § 1331 
jurisdiction over cases brought pursuant to the Tucker Acts.199 Not only 
does this practice under the Tucker Acts appear at odds with our previously 
reviewed cases, but also the Holmes test offers no coherent means of 
accounting for this distinction. The Mims approach, with its rights-inclusive 
analysis, provides the conceptual space to account for this difference in 
practice. 
Both the Tucker Acts cases and the Shoshone Mining Co. lines of cases 
feature federal causes of action paired with state law rights. Nevertheless, 
inclusion of a state law rule of decision in the Tucker Acts is accomplished 
discretionarily as a matter of federal common law.200 State law rules of 
decision are mandated by Congress in the Shoshone Mining Co. et al.201 It is 
this difference in the strength of force—mandatory versus discretionary—
by which the state law right applies that explains the different jurisdictional 
treatment here.202 It is only with a focus upon the nature of the rule of 
decision in the § 1331 analysis, as is forwarded in the Mims decision, that 
Shoshone Mining Co. and the line of cases involving the Miller Act, FTCA, 
 
omitted)); United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979); Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 
369. 
199  See C.H. Sanders Co. v. BHAP Hous. Dev. Fund Co., 903 F.2d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1990) (“We 
hold that an action (regardless of the amount sought) may be commenced under § 1331 in the district 
court provided there is an independent waiver of sovereign immunity outside the Tucker Act.”); see also 
W. Sec. Co. v. Derwinski, 937 F.2d 1276, 1280–81 (7th Cir. 1991) (similar); Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. 
Heller, 572 F.2d 174, 182 n.14 (8th Cir. 1978) (similar). Other circuits disagree. See Marceau v. 
Blackfeet Hous. Auth., 455 F.3d 974, 986 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006), modified on other grounds, 540 F.3d 916 
(9th Cir. 2008); A.E. Finley & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 898 F.2d 1165, 1167 (6th Cir. 1990) (per 
curiam) (“[I]f an action rests within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Claims Court under the Tucker 
Act . . . the district court does not have jurisdiction regardless of other possible statutory bases.”); New 
Mexico v. Regan, 745 F.2d 1318, 1321–22 (10th Cir. 1984); Graham v. Henegar, 640 F.2d 732, 734 & 
n.6 (5th Cir. Unit A Mar. 1981) (similar). The D.C. Circuit has noted the split but has declined to 
comment. See Md. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 763 F.2d 1441, 1448 n.4 
(D.C. Cir. 1985). There seems little doubt that the Tucker Acts present constitutional federal questions. 
See Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 610 (1949) (Rutledge, J., concurring) 
(“Suffice it to say that, if such suits are not ‘Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party,’ 
they are presumptively within the purview of the [constitutional] federal-question jurisdiction . . . . This 
is, at least, the conventional view of district court jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.”). 
200  See, e.g., Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. at 860 (plurality opinion) (stating that the issue in this Tucker 
Act suit was whether to apply special rules not available to private parties at state law, thus illustrating 
that the Court had the authority to deviate if it so chose); id. at 919 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that 
he would keep the special sovereign defenses, further illustrating the authority of the Court to diverge 
from state law here); id. at 924, 937 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting he would apply special contract 
rules in this instance, again illustrating the Court’s authority to deviate from state law); see also supra 
notes 197–98 and accompanying text (discussing the application of state law rules of decision as a 
matter of federal common law). 
201  See supra Part II.A (discussing the mandatory nature of a state law rule of decision). 
202  See Mulligan, Cross-Reference, supra note 11, at 1212–14 (discussing the discretionary 
application of state law rights and federal question jurisdiction in the context of the Tucker Acts). 
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and Tucker Acts can be coherently incorporated into one standard § 1331 
canon—a distinction that even the contemporary iteration of the Holmes 
test cannot address. 
2. Federal Enclaves Cases.—Next, I look to § 1331 jurisdiction over 
civil claims arising in federal enclaves. Here, federal courts take jurisdiction 
over suits that nominally appear similar to the Shoshone Mining Co. line of 
cases because they feature federal causes of action coupled with state law 
rights. Like Tucker Acts suits, however, only a rights-inclusive view of 
§ 1331 jurisdiction, as is deployed in Mims, can adequately account for the 
courts’ differing treatments. 
Congress possesses exclusive legislative jurisdiction over federal 
enclaves—land ceded by states to the federal government for the 
construction of federal installations.203 Given that balance of power, state 
law does not survive cessation to the federal government.204 Nevertheless, 
Congress seldom passes comprehensive codes of contract or tort law that 
would apply to suits arising in federal enclaves. 
As a result, civil law205 in these enclaves is typically found by a 
constitutional presumption that the law of the state in which the federal 
enclave sits applies.206 While the Court has announced three competing 
theories regarding the scope of this constitutional presumption applying 
state civil law in federal enclaves,207 the leading view holds that, absent 
congressional action to the contrary, all law of the state in which the federal 
 
203  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (permitting the federal government to set up enclaves within states 
if the relevant state legislature grants consent). Due to the circumstances of the cessation of the land at 
issue, federal enclaves come in four varieties. The federal government may hold (1) exclusive authority 
over the area, (2) authority concurrently with the state, (3) authority limited to particular subjects, or 
(4) no authority, but rather hold property as a normal proprietor. See Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The 
Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L. REV. 542, 554 n.73 (1983). 
204  See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 203. 
205  Congress has incorporated state criminal law by statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2006) (cross-
referencing state criminal law as the operative law in federal enclaves). 
206  See James Stewart & Co. v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94, 99 (1940) (“The Constitution does not 
command that every vestige of the laws of the former sovereignty [in federal enclaves] must 
vanish. . . . [It] has long been interpreted so as to permit the continuance until abrogated of those 
rules . . . .”). There are, however, several areas of civil law where Congress has passed specific statutory 
regulation. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 457 (2006) (cross-referencing state wrongful death law as operative in 
federal enclaves); Stephen E. Castlen & Gregory O. Block, Exclusive Federal Legislative Jurisdiction: 
Get Rid of It!, 154 MIL. L. REV. 113, 123–24 (1997) (providing a comprehensive set of examples). In 
this section, however, I am not focusing on those instances of statutory cases, but rather on those 
instances where Congress has not acted and the federal courts cross-reference state law by constitutional 
presumption. See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 203, at 555–56 (discussing statutory incorporation of 
state civil law in federal enclaves). 
207  See Kelly v. Lockheed Martin Servs. Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.P.R. 1998) (noting that the 
Supreme Court has not reconciled these competing holdings); Michael J. Malinowski, Note, Federal 
Enclaves and Local Law: Carving Out a Domestic Violence Exception to Exclusive Legislative 
Jurisdiction, 100 YALE L.J. 189, 193–96 (1990) (providing an overview of the Court’s three theories of 
enclave jurisdiction). 
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enclave resides is applicable within the enclave unless it interferes with the 
federal government’s constitutional legislative jurisdiction.208 
Civil actions arising in federal enclaves are treated, jurisdictionally 
speaking, similarly to Tucker Acts cases. First, the courts treat the cause of 
action in such suits as a federal one.209 State law, however, provides the 
rules of decision in such cases.210 Like Tucker Acts cases, the courts 
universally take § 1331 jurisdiction over these claims.211 Again, like the 
Tucker Acts suits, the inclusion of a state law rule of decision in the enclave 
cases is accomplished discretionarily as a matter of federal common law,212 
while state law rules of decision are mandated by Congress in Shoshone 
Mining Co. et al.213 Again, it is this difference in the strength of force by 
which the state law right applies that explains the different jurisdictional 
treatment here.214 Unlike the Mims rights-inclusive analysis, the Holmes 
test’s cause-of-action-centered view is incapable of accounting for the 
courts’ disparate treatment of the enclave cases as compared to the 
Shoshone Mining Co. line of cases. 
C. Jurisdiction Without a Federal Cause of Action 
Invoking a tradition dating to the nineteenth century,215 the federal 
courts will take § 1331 jurisdiction over cases in which state law causes of 
action are coupled with federal rights.216 State law causes of action are 
frequently conjoined with federal rights.217 State statutes often create state 
law causes of action that mandatorily deploy federal law as the rule of 
 
208  See Howard v. Comm’rs of the Sinking Fund of Louisville, 344 U.S. 624, 626–27 (1953). 
209  See, e.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99 (1972) (characterizing causes of action 
in enclave cases as arising out of federal common law); Mater v. Holley, 200 F.2d 123, 124 (5th Cir. 
1952) (holding that because state law rules of decision apply only at the discretion of federal authority, 
the cause of action in enclave cases is federal in origin). 
210  See supra notes 205–08 and accompanying text (discussing the applicability of state law in 
federal enclaves). 
211  See, e.g., City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 99 (citing with approval Mater v. Holley’s taking of 
§ 1331 jurisdiction over an enclave case); Durham v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 445 F.3d 1247, 1250–51 
(9th Cir. 2006) (holding that, because the alleged tort of exposure to asbestos occurred on a federal 
enclave, it invoked federal question jurisdiction under § 1331); Celli v. Shoell, 40 F.3d 324, 328 & n.4 
(10th Cir. 1994) (similar). 
212  See supra notes 206–08 and accompanying text (discussing the application of state law by 
rebuttable presumption). 
213  See supra Part II.A (discussing the mandatory nature of state law rules of decision). 
214  See Mulligan, Cross-Reference, supra note 11, at 1224–26 (discussing the discretionary 
application of state law rights and federal question jurisdiction in the context of the enclave cases). 
215  See infra Part III.A (discussing federal question jurisdiction doctrine at the time § 1331 was 
passed in 1875). 
216  See supra note 65. 
217  See Mulligan, Cross-Reference, supra note 11, at 1221–23. 
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decision.218 Similarly, state common law causes of action often rely upon 
federal statutory219 and constitutional220 rights as the rule of decision. Taking 
§ 1331 jurisdiction over such suits, of course, runs contrary to the dictates 
of the classic presentation of the Holmes test.221 I turn now to a brief 
discussion of when such cases will arise under § 1331 jurisdiction, focusing 
upon the Court’s post-American Well Works cases. 
I begin with Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co.,222 where, as 
discussed above,223 a stockholder sued in federal court to enjoin his 
corporation from purchasing bonds issued pursuant to the Federal Farm 
Loan Act.224 The plaintiff argued that such a purchase constituted a state law 
breach of fiduciary duty cause of action because the corporation could only 
purchase bonds “authorized to be issued by a valid law” and that the 
Federal Farm Loan Act was unconstitutional.225 Although the plaintiff 
pursued a state law cause of action, the Court held, over Justice Holmes’s 
strong dissent,226 that: 
 
218  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 54.1(d) (West 2007) (cross-referencing rights created by the 
Americans with Disabilities Act); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-51q (West 2011) (creating a cause of 
action against employers who discipline or discharge an employee for exercising First Amendment 
rights); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-17-560 (2003) (similar cross-reference to federal constitutional rights); see 
also GA. CODE. ANN. § 16-14-3(9)(A) (West Supp. 2011) (defining racketeering by cross-reference to 
federal statutes); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-10-101(a) (2008) (defining prohibited narcotics by cross-
reference to federal law). 
219  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 311–12 
(2005) (applying IRS standard in a state law quiet title action); Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 
478 U.S. 804, 805–07 (1986) (seeking to use federal FDCA standards in a state law negligence per se 
action); Vinnick v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 471, 481 (Ct. App. 2001) (“[The] negligence 
per se standard can be applied to a violation of federal standards . . . .”); Coker v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
642 So. 2d 774, 776, 778 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a violation of the federal Gun Control 
Act can amount to negligence per se); Lohmann ex rel. Lohmann v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 948 S.W.2d 
659, 672 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that the plaintiff could amend the petition to include “negligence 
per se in failing to comply with federal regulations”). 
220  See, e.g., Ex parte Duvall, 782 So. 2d 244, 246, 248 (Ala. 2000) (holding that state law torts of 
assault, unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and conspiracy were barred as a matter of law because the 
police officer met the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause standard when detaining the plaintiff); Susag 
v. City of Lake Forest, 115 Cal. Rptr. 2d 269, 278 (Ct. App. 2002) (holding that the plaintiff’s state law 
claims of battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and false imprisonment failed as a matter 
of law because the plaintiff “did not meet his burden of producing evidence showing [the defendants] 
used physical force against or exerted authority over him that resulted in a ‘seizure’ under the Fourth 
Amendment”); Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 641 A.2d 289, 293 (Pa. 1994) (noting that a plaintiff alleging 
false imprisonment must show that a defendant’s actions were unlawful, which often amounts to 
whether a defendant acting under color of law had probable cause). 
221  See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Holmes’s dissent in Smith). 
222  255 U.S. 180 (1921). 
223  See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
224  See 255 U.S. at 195. 
225  Id. at 198. 
226  See supra notes 50–54 and accompanying text. 
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[W]here it appears from the bill or statement of the plaintiff that the right to 
relief depends upon the construction or application of the Constitution . . . and 
that such federal claim is not merely colorable, . . . the District Court has 
jurisdiction under this provision.227 
In so doing, the Court found that a plaintiff could avail himself of a federal 
forum on a state law theory of recovery under § 1331 because the plaintiff’s 
state law cause of action necessarily required the court to pass upon the 
constitutionality of a federal act.228 
The Court engaged with this Smith-style approach to § 1331 
jurisdiction several times in the ensuing years,229 culminating with its 
decision in Grable & Sons.230 Here, the IRS seized real property belonging 
to Grable & Sons to satisfy a federal tax deficiency and sold the property to 
Darue Engineering.231 Five years later, Grable & Sons sued Darue 
Engineering in state court to quiet title, a state law cause of action.232 Grable 
& Sons asserted that Darue Engineering’s title was invalid because the IRS 
had conveyed the seizure notice to Grable & Sons in violation of provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code governing such actions.233 The Supreme Court 
affirmed § 1331 jurisdiction in the case because the plaintiff’s state law 
cause of action necessarily depended upon a claim of a substantive federal 
right.234 The Court elaborated on this holding, ruling that § 1331 jurisdiction 
will exist if the plaintiff asserts a “substantial” and “serious” claim to a 
federally created right,235 the federal right is the central and predominant 
question in the case,236 the legal content of the federal right invoked is 
actually contested by the parties,237 and taking jurisdiction in the case 
comports with congressional intent regarding the division of labor between 
 
227  Smith, 255 U.S. at 199. 
228  See id. at 201–02. 
229  See, e.g., Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 805–07 (1986) (seeking to use 
federal FDCA standards in a negligence per se action); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation 
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9 (1983) (discussing Smith-style jurisdiction); Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 
659–60 (1963) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (similar); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 318–
22 (1936) (taking jurisdiction over a state law fiduciary duty case that presented an embedded 
constitutional challenge). In prior work, I provided a more detailed account of this line of cases. See 
Mulligan, A Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1698–1701, 1710–12, 1721–25. 
230  545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
231  Id. at 310–11. 
232  Id. at 311. 
233  Id. Grable maintained that the IRS failed to comply with the notice procedures of 26 U.S.C. 
§ 6335(a). 
234  545 U.S. at 316. 
235  See, e.g., id. at 313 (“It has in fact become a constant refrain in such cases that federal 
jurisdiction demands not only a contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal 
interest in claiming the advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”). 
236  Id. 
237  Id. 
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the state and federal courts.238 The Court reaffirmed the validity of this 
approach a year later, though noting that Grable & Sons jurisdiction 
constitutes a “special and small” exception to the classic Holmes test 
view.239 
 
 * * * 
 
The Smith line of cases—along with the Shoshone Mining Co., Miller 
Act, FTCA, procedural rights, Tucker Acts, and federal enclave cases—
illustrate that neither the classic nor the contemporary iterations of the 
Holmes test are descriptively accurate accounts of significant portions of 
the Court’s § 1331 canon. 
 
238  Id. at 313–14. To be clear, the Court treats the substantial right factor as necessary, but not 
sufficient, for finding § 1331 jurisdiction. Id. at 318–19. It also requires a finding that jurisdiction “is 
consistent with congressional judgment about the sound division of labor between state and federal 
courts governing the application of § 1331.” Id. at 313–14. For lower court examples of this specific 
finding of congressional intent, see Broder v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 418 F.3d 187, 19496 (2d Cir. 
2005) (applying Grable & Sons and taking jurisdiction over a state law contract claim that required 
construction of federal cable television law because taking this jurisdiction would not upset the flow of 
litigation in state and federal courts), and Municipality of San Juan v. Corporación para el Fomento 
Económico de la Ciudad Capital, 415 F.3d 145, 148 n.6 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying Grable & Sons and 
taking jurisdiction over state law contract claim that required construction of HUD regulations); see also 
Redish, supra note 16, at 1793 (arguing that federal question jurisdiction over hybrid claims should lie 
to “increase the level of state-federal judicial interchange in the shaping and development of the relevant 
federal statute”); Mr. Smith, supra note 111, at 2292 (arguing that by incorporating federal law, “a state 
might be understood to have waived its claim to exclusive jurisdiction over a violation of the hybrid 
law”). 
239  Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699–701 (2006) (noting that 
Grable & Sons remains good law, although it was not applicable in that case). 
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TABLE 1: THE SUPREME COURT’S § 1331 CANON 
 State Law Right Federal Right 
State Law 
Cause of 
Action 
(a) No § 1331 jurisdiction; this 
would be so-called protective 
jurisdiction.240 
(b) Possible § 1331 jurisdiction if 
Grable & Sons standard met. 
Federal 
Cause of 
Action 
(c) Yes § 1331 jurisdiction  
if state law right is applied at the 
discretion of the federal courts. 
(d) Yes § 1331 jurisdiction  
if federal right applied is 
substantive. 
(e) No § 1331 jurisdiction  
if state law right is mandatorily 
applied by the federal courts. 
(f) No § 1331 jurisdiction  
if federal right is procedural. 
 
As the Table 1 illustrates, it is the nature of the right asserted in 
conjunction with the federal cause of action, not the origin of the cause of 
action simpliciter, that is the key to determining whether a case arises under 
§ 1331—just as the Mims test states.241 The classic presentation of the 
Holmes test, which finds that a federal cause of action is both a necessary 
and sufficient condition for § 1331 jurisdiction, is underinclusive in relation 
to category (b) cases and overinclusive in relation to category (e) and (f) 
cases. Even the modern incarnation of the Holmes test, which finds that a 
federal cause of action is at a minimum a sufficient condition for § 1331 
jurisdiction, cannot account for the Court’s exclusion of cases in categories 
(e) and (f). Mims’s recasting of the Holmes test, moreover, sheds light upon 
the Court’s oft-repeated statement that “the vast majority of cases brought 
under the general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts are 
those in which federal law creates the cause of action.”242 Despite the fact 
that this statement facially includes cases in categories (c) through (f), it 
seems clear that the Court was contemplating only category (d) cases; 
namely, cases pairing federal causes of action with federal substantive 
 
240  While the idea that state law rights paired with state law causes of action might arise as a matter 
of Article III federal question jurisdiction has supporters, see Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction 
and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224–25 (1948), no one 
contends that such suits could arise under § 1331, see BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. v. MCImetro Access 
Transmission Servs., Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1290 (11th Cir. 2003) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting) (“The theory of 
protective jurisdiction applies only within the context of a special jurisdictional statute; no one has ever 
argued that section 1331 itself amounts to a grant of jurisdiction to entertain state law claims on 
particular matters of federal concern.”). 
241  See Mulligan, A Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1725 (“[T]he primary determinate for the 
vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction is the status of the federal right asserted.”). 
242  Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808 (1986); see also Franchise Tax Bd. 
v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1983) (noting it is “well settled that Justice 
Holmes’ test is more useful for describing the vast majority of cases that come within the district courts’ 
original jurisdiction” than those beyond district court jurisdiction). 
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rights.243 Only a standard formulation of the § 1331 test that is rights 
inclusive, as Mims is, can coherently exclude category (c), (e), and (f) cases 
from the vast majority of cases that arise when a federal cause of action is 
paired with a substantive federal right. Therefore, adopting a rights-
inclusive approach, as Mims does, provides a single coherent framework to 
incorporate a fuller § 1331 canon than does the Holmes test. 
The Mims decision, however, does not resolve every ambiguity in 
§ 1331 doctrine. As I have previously argued, the Court requires that 
federal common law claims that are crafted without statutory authorization 
meet a more rigorous jurisdictional standard than other claims.244 Merely 
looking to the federal versus state origin of the causes of action and rights, 
as Mims directs, does not capture this practice fully. Rather, the Court 
should more transparently acknowledge that the legislative versus judicial 
origin of the rights at issue, not just the federal versus state origin, plays a 
role in § 1331 doctrine.245 Nevertheless, the Court’s language in Mims—
looking to both rights and causes of action in the § 1331 analysis—
represents the most inclusive and coherent summation of actual § 1331 
practice since the Court in Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., in another 
thoroughly un-Holmesean moment, held that “[t]he federal nature of the 
right to be established is decisive [in determining federal question 
jurisdiction]—not the source of the authority to establish it.”246 For this 
reason alone, the Mims decision is worthy of praise and, most importantly, 
replication. 
III. MIMS AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
In this final Part, I turn to the increased space for a focus upon 
congressional intent inherent in the Mims rights-inclusive approach to 
§ 1331 jurisdiction. Here I contend that the Mims analysis—one that, 
contrary to the dictates of the Holmes test, includes both causes of action 
and rights in the standard jurisdictional analysis—not only offers greater 
jurisprudential coherence and explanatory power over the statutory federal 
question jurisdictional canon than does the Holmes test, but is also more 
solicitous of congressional intent. Thus, the Mims position maintains a 
stronger normative claim to be the preferred, standard interpretation of 
§ 1331 than does the Holmes test. 
Congressional intent has had an odd relationship with statutory federal 
question jurisdiction. On the one hand, it is beyond debate that blackletter 
 
243  See Mulligan, A Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1691–92, 1694, 1708–09, 1714–15 
(describing such cases as the actual heartland of federal question jurisdiction cases). 
244  See id. at 1716–26 (arguing that the Court in “pure” federal common law cases takes § 1331 
jurisdiction only when the plaintiff presents a substantial federal common law right coupled with a 
sufficient showing to support the right). 
245  Id. 
246  288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933). 
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constitutional law places the control of lower federal court jurisdiction, 
subject to a few quibbles here and there, squarely within Congress’s 
control.247 On the other hand, most commentators contend that the Court’s 
statutory federal question jurisdiction canon has had little to do with 
congressional intent248 but rather has focused upon several factors that can 
be loosely characterized as federalism and docket-control concerns that the 
Court itself, not Congress, evaluates.249 Moreover, many scholars go on to 
argue from this descriptive claim to the normative conclusion that 
jurisdiction is properly a function of judicial discretion in which judges, in 
conjunction with Congress perhaps, must determine the proper division of 
labor between the state and federal courts.250 
 
247  See, e.g., Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341–42 (1969) (finding that the Constitution places the 
power to “expand the jurisdiction of [the lower federal] courts . . . specifically . . . in the Congress, not in 
the courts”); Friedman, supra note 17, at 2 (“[C]ommentators mark out their individual lines defining 
the precise scope of Congress’s authority, but no one has challenged the central assumption that 
Congress bears primary responsibility for defining federal court jurisdiction.”); Lumen N. Mulligan, Did 
the Madisonian Compromise Survive Detention at Guantánamo?, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (2010) 
[hereinafter Mulligan, Madisonian Compromise] (arguing that the Court’s Boumediene opinion is 
perhaps unique in that it implicitly requires the existence of at least one lower federal court to hear 
habeas claims against federal officers). 
248  See, e.g., F. Andrew Hessick III, The Common Law of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 60 ALA. L. 
REV. 895, 897–98 (2009) (“[The] Court has developed these [§ 1331] doctrines based principally on its 
own perception that restricting federal jurisdiction was necessary to avoid overburdening the federal 
courts . . . [and] without regard to Congressional intent.”); see also Donald L. Doernberg, There’s No 
Reason for It; It’s Just Our Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of 
Federal Question Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 599 (1987) (similar). 
249  See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 (1983) (stating that the 
vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction “masks a welter of issues regarding the interrelation of federal and state 
authority and the proper management of the federal judicial system”); Paul M. Bator, The State Courts 
and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 622 (1981) (“[State and federal 
courts] will continue to be partners in the task of defining and enforcing federal constitutional principles. 
The question remains as to where to draw the lines; but line-drawing is the correct enterprise.”); Felix 
Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 
499, 506 (1928) (“[T]he proper allocation of authority between United States and state courts is but part 
of the perennial concern over the wise distribution of power between the states and the nation.”); Barry 
Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 
104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1216 (2004) (“A central task of the law of federal jurisdiction is allocating 
cases between state and federal courts.”). 
250  See Ann Althouse, The Humble and the Treasonous: Judge-Made Jurisdiction Law, 40 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 1035, 1049 (1990) (contending that judges are in a good position “to fill out some of the 
details in jurisdictional statutes”); Jack M. Beermann, “Bad” Judicial Activism and Liberal Federal-
Courts Doctrine: A Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
1053, 1061–66 (1990) (suggesting that judicial discretion helps federal courts avoid overload); David L. 
Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 588 (1985) (“[T]he responsibility of the 
federal courts to adjudicate disputes does and should carry with it significant leeway for the exercise of 
reasoned discretion in matters relating to federal jurisdiction.”); David L. Shapiro, Reflections on the 
Allocation of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts: A Response to “Reassessing the 
Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and Federal Courts,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1845 (1992) 
(“[H]istory, tradition, and policy support the existence of limited judicial discretion to interpret and 
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While I cannot fully defend the position here, I predicate the remainder 
of my discussion upon the axiom that an increased focus upon 
congressional intent in § 1331 jurisprudence is normatively attractive on 
both separation of powers and process-federalism grounds.251 From this 
vantage point, then, Mims enhances a congressional-intent focus in § 1331 
jurisdiction along two axes. First, the Mims decision’s rights-inclusive 
formulation more closely maps onto the intent of the 1875 Congress that 
passed § 1331 than does the Holmes test. Second, the Mims rights-inclusive 
decision accounts for the jurisdictional intentions of later-in-time 
Congresses more readily than does the Holmes test. 
A. The Intent of the 1875 Congress 
I begin with a brief account of the intent of the 1875 Congress, the 
body that passed § 1331.252 In this section, I follow Woolhandler and 
Collins’s thorough historical research on late nineteenth-century 
jurisdictional practice.253 As they demonstrate, the federal courts’ practice of 
regularly taking federal question jurisdiction over state law causes of action 
with embedded federal rights under any number of special pre-1875 federal 
question statutes created Congress’s expectation that such a practice would 
continue with the passage of § 1331. The Mims opinion’s rights-inclusive 
view, therefore, more accurately accounts for the intent of the 1875 
Congress than does the Holmes test. 
Nineteenth-century Congresses regularly relied upon state law (or the 
general common law)254 to supply the cause of action to enforce federal 
statutory rights. Nevertheless, the federal courts—contrary to the dictates of 
the Holmes test—took federal question jurisdiction under the right-by-right 
jurisdictional statutes then applicable.255 For example, in 1833, Congress 
passed the Force Act in response to the South Carolina nullification crisis.256 
Under the Act, federal courts had statutory federal question jurisdiction 
over plaintiffs’ common law assumpsit claims to recover duties that were 
levied over the amount specified by federal tariff law.257 Similarly, the 
 
apply jurisdictional grants and to refrain from reaching the merits of a controversy even when the 
existence of jurisdiction is clear.”). 
251  See Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1726–28 & n.338. 
252  See supra note 18 (discussing the legislative history of § 1331). 
253  See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 19, at 2158–78. 
254  These were pre-Erie days. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (rejecting the idea of 
a “general” common law distinct from the law of a particular state). 
255  See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 19, at 2160–68 (discussing this point in greater detail). 
256  Act of Mar. 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632. 
257  Id. § 2; see, e.g., Rankin v. Hoyt, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 327, 328 (1846) (entertaining an assumpsit 
action on a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York); 
Swartwout v. Gihon, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 110, 110 (1845) (similar); see also Ins. Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. (5 
Wall.) 541, 543 (1866) (“Under that act [i.e., the Force Act of 1833] citizens of the same State might sue 
each other for causes arising under the revenue laws. A citizen injured by the proceedings of a collector 
107:237 (2012) You Can’t Go Holmes Again 
 279 
Court recognized that common law mandamus causes of action brought to 
enforce federal statutory rights arose under statutory federal question 
jurisdiction.258 Finally, the Court recognized that common law causes of 
action could be deployed to enforce postal consumers’ rights as federal 
questions.259 
The 1875 Congress passed § 1331 against this backdrop, which 
illustrates their intent, consistent with the Mims approach, that federal 
rights, even when not paired with a federal cause of action, be amenable to 
§ 1331 jurisdiction. First, the legislative history to the 1875 Act strongly 
suggests that the Congress intended to deploy the entire scope of 
constitutional federal question jurisdiction when it passed § 1331.260 Thus, 
this pre-1875 practice demonstrates, in part, the broad scope of the 
jurisdictional grant § 1331 was intended to provide. Moreover, 
jurisdictional practice immediately after passage of § 1331 further 
demonstrates the strong role that federal rights, unadorned with federal 
causes of action, played in the original understanding of § 1331. Indeed, 
§ 1331 “almost seamlessly became a vehicle for [state law] nonstatutory 
equity and damages actions containing [federal] constitutional elements.”261 
The Mims opinion’s reconstruction of the default § 1331 test to a rights-
inclusive perspective, therefore, more closely maps traditional statutory-
intent principles than does the Holmes test. 
B. The Intent of Later-in-Time Congresses 
One might well accept that the Mims approach comports with the 
intention of the 1875 Congress yet still conclude, because the twentieth-
century Court’s § 1331 jurisprudence has not focused on congressional 
intent pursuant to traditional statutory construction tools,262 that there is 
little role for congressional intent to play now. Moreover, one might even 
contend that this failure to embrace fully the intent of the 1875 Congress is 
sound because, if § 1331 were read as encompassing the full scope of the 
Article III font of federal question authority as many have suggested was 
 
might have an action [in assumpsit] against him for the injury, though a citizen of the same State with 
himself.”); Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137, 138 (1836) (recognizing an assumpsit action 
against a collector for excess duties paid under protest in an action removed from state court). 
258  See Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624–25 (1838) (recognizing 
that the Circuit Court for Washington County in the District of Columbia had power to issue mandamus 
to an officer of the federal government); see also Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 514–15 
(1840) (same). 
259  See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 19, at 2167 (discussing Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 
How.) 284 (1851)). 
260  See infra note 263 and accompanying text. 
261  Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 19, at 2173 (discussing the vesting of § 1331 jurisdiction in 
the 1880s and 1890s). 
262  See Friedman, supra note 17, at 24 (“Congress’s intent [in enacting § 1331] has had little or 
nothing to do with the Court’s decisions concerning what constitutes a federal question.”). 
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the intent of the 1875 Congress,263 federal question jurisdiction likely would 
encroach into vast swathes of presumed exclusive state court jurisdiction.264 
Thus, this congressional-intent reading of § 1331 doctrine, one might 
conclude, is internally inconsistent as it runs counter to fundamental 
federalism principles that the Court imputes to Congress as a default 
legislative intention.265 
Nevertheless, the Mims view, even if construed not to invoke fully the 
intent of the 1875 Congress, creates an intellectual space for the 
jurisdictional intentions of later-in-time Congresses in the § 1331 
discussion. This room for legislative intent results because the courts find 
that federal rights, as well as federal causes of action, create indicia of 
congressional intent that such issues be heard in federal court. Therefore, 
the Mims opinion more accurately reflects the jurisdictional intentions of 
later-in-time Congresses than does the Holmes test, thereby avoiding the 
critique that a congressional intent model of § 1331 is necessarily static and 
incapable of accounting for the changing roles of the federal and state 
courts since 1875.266 
In line with this approach to congressional intent, the Mims Court held 
that there is a strong presumption that a congressionally created federal 
cause of action coupled with a federal rule of decision will take jurisdiction 
under § 1331. The Court itself defended this presumption by arguing that it 
is the complementary interpretation to the previously accepted rule 
recognizing a presumption that suits arising in federal question jurisdiction 
can concurrently be heard in state courts.267 
 
263  See, e.g., Franchise Tax Bd. v. Const. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 8 n.8 (legislative 
history indicates Congress may have meant to confer all jurisdiction that the Constitution allows); 
2 CONG. REC. 4986 (1874) (statement of Sen. Carpenter) (equating the statutory and constitutional 
grants of federal question jurisdiction); Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question 
Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 723 (1986) (same); Friedman, supra note 17, at 21 (same). 
264  See Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824) (holding that a case arises 
under federal law for purposes of Article III if federal law “forms an ingredient of the original cause”). 
But see Anthony J. Bellia Jr., The Origins of Article III “Arising Under” Jurisdiction, 57 DUKE L.J. 263, 
270 (2007) (arguing that in light of English jurisdictional principles, the Osborn Court interpreted 
Article III “arising under” to mean that a federal court could hear cases in which a federal law was 
determinative of a right asserted in the proceeding before it). Bellia’s reading would very much limit the 
scope of Article III to those cases I argue pertain to § 1331. 
265  The Court’s treatment of preemption cases expresses this sentiment well. Here the starting point 
for analyzing the preemptive effect of any federal law that operates “in a field which the States have 
traditionally occupied” is with a presumption against preemption. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 
U.S. 218, 230 (1947); see also Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“[W]e have long 
presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”). 
266  See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 17, at 3 (discussing the need for an approach to federal 
jurisdiction that is “flexible enough to take into account changing conceptions of the roles” of various 
courts). 
267  See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 748 (2012) (citing Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 
U.S. 455, 458–59 (1990); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981)) (noting the 
presumption of concurrent state court jurisdiction). 
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More germane to this discussion, the Mims presumption of § 1331 
jurisdiction garners support on congressional-intent grounds.268 Even 
without the parallel to the concurrent-state-court-jurisdiction argument, a 
presumption in favor of § 1331 jurisdiction follows because each 
component of the jurisdictional analysis deployed by the Mims Court, the 
cause of action and the right, lends strength to the assertion that 
congressional intent supports taking jurisdiction.269 Thus, a plaintiff’s 
presentation of a congressionally created cause of action is strong evidence 
that Congress desires cases of that type be heard in federal court because 
this amounts to a finding that Congress has determined that the plaintiff is 
“an appropriate party to invoke the power of the [federal] courts” in the 
matter at hand.270 Similarly, congressional creation of rights, in the vast 
majority of cases,271 also constitutes strong evidence of legislative intent to 
vest the federal courts with § 1331 jurisdiction over suits seeking to 
vindicate such rights because Congress intends that its clearly stated, 
mandatory obligations will be enforced, and it legislates against a historical 
backdrop in which the federal courts have been essential to the enforcement 
of such federal rights.272 As a result, the Mims presentation of the default 
 
268  See, e.g., Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1730; Howard M. Wasserman, 
Jurisdiction and Merits, 80 WASH. L. REV. 643, 677–78 (2005) (“The significance of statutory general 
federal question jurisdiction is that when Congress enacts a substantive law, federal district courts 
immediately and necessarily attain jurisdiction to hear claims under that statute, without Congress 
having to do anything more.” (footnote omitted)). Of course, this only follows when one discusses 
statutory, not constitutional, federal question jurisdiction. If there were not a well-established series of 
lower federal courts, such a presumption may well be unsound. See Mulligan, Madisonian Compromise, 
supra note 247, at 539–40 (outlining the Madisonian Compromise view, which finds that the 
Constitution does not require the existence of the lower federal courts). 
269  See, e.g., Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1726 (“[W]hen there are other strong 
indicia of congressional intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction such as the existence of a statutory cause of 
action, the plaintiff’s assertion of a federal right may be quite weak. Conversely, when there are few 
other congressional indicia of an intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction, the plaintiff must make a stronger 
allegation of a federal right in order for § 1331 jurisdiction to lie.”). 
270  Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979). 
271  There are a few instances where Congress creates federal rights without a concurrent intent to 
vest the federal courts with § 1331 jurisdiction. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (2006) (limiting most 
Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act claims to state court). 
272  See, e.g., Letters from the Federal Farmer XV (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 315 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (“It is true, the laws are made by the legislature; 
but the judges and juries, in their interpretations, and in directing the execution of them, have a very 
extensive influence for preserving or destroying liberty, and for changing the nature of the 
government.”); Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: 
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1397 (1953) (“Remember the Federalist papers. Were 
the framers wholly mistaken in thinking that, as a matter of the hard facts of power, a government needs 
courts to vindicate its decisions?”); id. at 1372–73 (discussing the role of enforcement courts and the 
constitutional constraints that come into play when Congress confers jurisdiction to enforce federal law); 
John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 712 n.163 (1997) 
(“[A]ny effort to pare back federal jurisdiction would deny Congress an important and historically 
effective forum for the implementation of its laws.”); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, 
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§ 1331 test, with its focus upon both rights and causes of action, provides a 
richer vein for congressional-intent analysis than does the Holmes test. 
A similar presumption of § 1331 jurisdiction over constitutional claims 
is justifiable upon congressional-intent grounds. The Court regularly 
engages in a strong presumption, similar to the statutory one crafted in 
Mims, that Congress intends for the federal courts to hear actions to enforce 
constitutional rights.273 This finding of intent to enforce constitutional rights 
in federal courts, when joined with a congressionally created cause of action 
to enforce the constitutional right, demonstrates strong indicia of legislative 
intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction.274 
Mims’s rights-inclusive view also affords a congressional-intent 
justification for the Court’s use of a stiffer jurisdictional standard when 
taking § 1331 jurisdiction over cases coupling state law causes of action 
with federal rights.275 In Grable & Sons, the Court distinguished the 
“substantial” and “serious” claim to a federally created right, which is 
necessary to establish § 1331 jurisdiction when a state law cause of action is 
asserted, from mere colorable assertions of a congressionally created right 
which typically ground § 1331 jurisdiction.276 The Court stressed that in 
such cases the federal right at issue must be the central and predominant 
question in the case.277 Further, the Court emphasized that the legal content 
 
Resistance Norms, and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1611 (2000) 
(“Congress generally cannot ensure enforcement of its legislative mandates without providing a federal 
judicial forum where violators of those mandates can be prosecuted.”). 
273  See, e.g., Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517 (2003) (requiring a clear statement of legislative 
intent to bar habeas corpus review of constitutional violations); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 308–09 
(2001) (same); Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 494 U.S. 1, 12 (1990) (requiring a clear 
statement in the Tucker Act to withdraw jurisdiction); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988) 
(“[W]here Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must 
be clear.”); Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986) (requiring a 
heightened showing of legislative intent in part to avoid the “serious constitutional question” that would 
arise if a federal statute were construed to deny any judicial forum for a colorable constitutional claim); 
N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 112 (1982) (White, J., dissenting) 
(“[W]e cannot impute to Congress an intent now or in the future to transfer jurisdiction from 
constitutional to legislative courts for the purpose of emasculating the former.” (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373–74 (1974) (holding that a 
federal statute will not be construed to preclude judicial review of constitutional challenges absent clear 
and convincing evidence of congressional intent). 
274  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (creating a statutory cause of action to enforce constitutional 
rights against state actors); Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1708–10 (discussing the Court’s 
practice of taking § 1331 jurisdiction over constitutional claims coupled with statutory causes of action). 
275  See supra Part II.C (discussing Smith-style cases and the more rigorous jurisdictional test 
deployed). 
276  See, e.g., Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 313 (2005) 
(“It has in fact become a constant refrain in such cases that federal jurisdiction demands not only a 
contested federal issue, but a substantial one, indicating a serious federal interest in claiming the 
advantages thought to be inherent in a federal forum.”). 
277  Id. 
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of the right invoked must be actually contested by the parties.278 Finally, the 
Court specifically considered whether taking jurisdiction in the case 
comported with congressional intent regarding the division of labor 
between the state and federal courts.279 
This restrictive view makes sense from a congressional-intent 
perspective. Because a congressionally created cause of action is not 
pleaded in such cases, these plaintiffs concede, in essence, that they lack an 
explicit congressional judgment that they are “appropriate part[ies] to 
invoke the power of the [federal] courts.”280 Or as Justice Souter in Grable 
& Sons described it, plaintiffs missing a federal cause of action are not 
“missing [a] federal door key, always required, but . . . [rather are] missing 
[a] welcome mat.”281 Under the classic Holmes test, this lack of a cause of 
action would be outcome determinative, mandating a lack of § 1331 
jurisdiction.282 The Holmesean view, however, ignores the fact that the 
presence of federal rights—not just causes of action—also signifies 
congressional intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction.283 In suits that present state 
law causes of action coupled with federal rights, then, the existence of 
federal rights constitutes some indicia of congressional intent to vest 
§ 1331, but not as much as those cases in which a congressionally created 
cause of action is pleaded as well. As a result, the Court’s more rigorous 
jurisdictional standard comports with this lesser showing of congressional 
intent.284 Conversely, when a plaintiff pleads both a federal cause of action 
and a right, this greater indicia of congressional intent to vest § 1331 
jurisdiction supports the normal, colorable assertion standard for vesting 
§ 1331 jurisdiction.285 The Holmes test, with its cause-of-action-centered 
approach, cannot account for this more nuanced approach to congressional 
intent with the felicity that the Mims decision can, which again 
demonstrates the superiority of the Mims approach. 
The Mims decision, however, does not resolve all difficulties 
concerning the lack of congressional intent in jurisdictional analyses. The 
 
278  Id. 
279  See supra note 238 and accompanying text (discussing this prong of the Grable & Sons test). 
280  Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979) (defining cause of action). 
281  Grable & Sons, 545 U.S. at 318. 
282  See supra Part I.B (discussing the Holmes test). 
283  See supra notes 271–73 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent to vest 
jurisdiction over statutory and constitutional rights). 
284  See Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1734–35 (discussing the role for congressional 
intent in Smith-style cases). 
285  Id. at 1726 (“These two components—the federal right and cause of action—work in a teeter-
totter manner in relation to congressional intent. That is to say, when there are other strong indicia of 
congressional intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction such as the existence of a statutory cause of action, the 
plaintiff’s assertion of a federal right may be quite weak. Conversely, when there are few other 
congressional indicia of an intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction, the plaintiff must make a stronger 
allegation of a federal right in order for § 1331 jurisdiction to lie.”). 
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well-pleaded complaint rule, for one, does not seem amenable to such a 
reinterpretation under Mims as the inclusion of rights into the § 1331 
analysis simply does not supply a congressional-intent justification for the 
rule.286 Similarly, Mims’s rights-inclusive approach does not fully justify 
why federal common law cases, which lack strong indicia of congressional 
intent to vest § 1331 jurisdiction, arise under statutory federal question 
jurisdiction.287 Even if it is not a panacea, Mims does offer an avenue for an 
increased focus upon congressional intent in the default § 1331 analysis, 
which is a vast normative improvement over the Holmes test. 
CONCLUSION 
The rhetoric of the Holmes test “has earned its retirement.”288 In this 
piece, I argue that the jurisprudential foundation for the Holmes test has 
crumbled, that it lacks explanatory power over the full canon of § 1331 
decisions, and that it is divorced from a more meaningful use of 
congressional intent in statutory jurisdictional analyses. Given these 
failures, the Mims Court’s recasting of standard § 1331 doctrine away from 
the Holmes test and toward a theory of § 1331 jurisdiction that looks to 
whether “federal law creates [both] a private right of action and furnishes 
the substantive rules of decision”289 should kick off a new standard rhetoric. 
The Mims decision brings a coherence to the whole of § 1331 doctrine and 
a focus upon congressional intent that is long overdue. 
 
286  See, e.g., Doernberg, supra note 248, at 601–07 (arguing that the well-pleaded complaint rule 
does not comport with the intent of the 1875 Congress that originally passed § 1331). 
287  See Mulligan, Unified Theory, supra note 93, at 1716–26 (discussing the Court’s heightened 
jurisdictional standard over pure federal common law cases). 
288  Cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) (“[Conley v. Gibson’s] no set of facts 
[language] has earned its retirement. The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an 
accepted pleading standard.”). 
289  Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 132 S. Ct. 740, 748–49 (2012); see also supra notes 83–87 and 
accompanying text (listing other rights-inclusive quotations from Mims). 
